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INAPPROPRIATE FORUM OR INAPPROPRIATE LAW? 
A CHOICE-OF-LAW SOLUTION TO THE JURISDICTIONAL 
STANDOFF BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN 
AMERICA 
ABSTRACT 
Numerous substantive and procedural advantages make the U.S. court 
system a uniquely attractive forum to plaintiffs worldwide.  As a result, U.S. 
courts increasingly rely on forum non conveniens (FNC), a common law 
doctrine permitting a court to dismiss a case to another more convenient forum 
that is also available for the litigation.  When the foreign plaintiffs hail from 
Latin America, however, their home forums are often unavailable following an 
FNC dismissal due to the Latin American courts’ interpretation of their own 
preemptive system of jurisdiction.  To make this clear and prevent U.S. courts 
from dismissing for FNC, numerous Latin American countries recently have 
enacted “blocking statutes,” explicating that a Latin American court cannot 
exercise jurisdiction over a case dismissed abroad under the FNC doctrine.  
Many U.S. courts refuse to accept the outcome this legislation seems to dictate 
and, through incorrect FNC analysis, continue to dismiss these cases to Latin 
America, where they will not be heard. 
This Comment argues that the refusal of U.S. courts to accept jurisdiction 
over these cases reflects their discomfort with the reinterpretation of 
traditional civil law concepts embodied in the Latin American legislation, with 
outcome-determinative results.  Since numerous commentators have failed to 
recognize this, instead characterizing the blocking statutes as mere 
reiterations of longstanding civil law principles, no proposed solution has 
adequately accommodated the courts’ concerns alongside those of the 
plaintiffs.  An ideal strategy will both effectively manage a court’s forum 
shopping concerns and ensure a plaintiff his day in court.  Thus, rather than 
unreservedly accept jurisdiction over cases better heard elsewhere, or 
manipulate the FNC doctrine to exclude these cases and deny plaintiffs any 
relief, the solution should target the source of the problem: advantageous tort 
law in the United States, which draws plaintiffs to file cases here that are only 
tangentially related to the forum.  For this reason, choice-of-law legislation is 
the best course of action.  Mandatory application of foreign law to these 
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disputes effectively dissuades foreign plaintiffs from forum shopping in the 
United States without denying them a forum in which to litigate. 
 
INTRODUCTION  ............................................................................................ 1439 
 I. “COMPETING” JURISDICTIONAL DOCTRINES  .................................... 1444 
A. Forum Non Conveniens  ............................................................ 1445 
1. Origins and Overview of FNC in the United States  ........... 1445 
2. Modern Analysis of FNC  .................................................... 1447 
a. The Threshold Inquiry: Availability of an Adequate 
Alternative Forum  ....................................................... 1447 
b. The Public and Private Interest Factors of Gilbert: A 
Balancing of Conveniences  ......................................... 1449 
3. Policy Considerations of FNC ............................................ 1451 
B. Latin American Preemptive Legislation  ................................... 1453 
1. Civil Law Preemptive Jurisdiction  ..................................... 1454 
2. Latin American Blocking Statutes  ...................................... 1455 
 II. FNC MOTIONS TO LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES WITH BLOCKING 
STATUTES: AN EXPLANATION OF U.S. COURTS’ ANALYSES  ............ 1457 
A. Actual and Ideal Treatment by U.S. Courts of FNC 
Dismissals to Latin America  ..................................................... 1458 
B. How Blocking Statutes Alter Traditional Civil Law Rules of 
Preemptive Jurisdiction in Latin America: An Explanation of 
U.S. Courts’ Behavior  .............................................................. 1461 
1. Latin American Blocking Statutes: Civil Law Jurisdiction 
Reinterpreted  ...................................................................... 1462 
2. Implications of the Reinterpretations Embodied in the 
Blocking Statutes  ................................................................ 1466 
 III. POTENTIAL AND IDEAL U.S. RESPONSES TO LATIN AMERICAN 
PREEMPTIVE LEGISLATION  ............................................................... 1467 
A. Further Manipulation of FNC to Permit Dismissals Despite 
Latin American Blocking Statutes  ............................................ 1468 
B. Choice-of-Law Legislation to Target the Source of the 
Problem  .................................................................................... 1471 
1. Appropriateness of Application of Foreign Law  ................ 1472 
2. Desirability of Application of Foreign Law  ....................... 1475 
CONCLUSION  ................................................................................................ 1476 
  
SOLD GALLEYSFINAL 6/29/2011  1:36 PM 
2011] INAPPROPRIATE FORUM OR INAPPROPRIATE LAW? 1439 
INTRODUCTION 
And so the plaintiffs . . . argue that the United States has a greater 
interest in the litigation than Argentina because the defendants are 
American companies, while the defendants argue that Argentina has 
a greater interest than the United States because the plaintiffs are 
Argentines.  The reality is that neither country appears to have any 
interest in having the litigation tried in its courts . . . . 
—Judge Richard Posner1 
In our global economy, routine business endeavors affect a variety of 
people and places, as does the fallout when something goes wrong.  Inevitably, 
the question of which court will address the ensuing litigation is increasingly 
difficult as the numbers of affected persons and forums grow.  Each party has 
an interest in litigating in a particular court; each court has a particular interest 
in adjudicating—or not adjudicating, as the case may be.  Recent international 
developments in the context of disputes between Latin American plaintiffs and 
U.S. defendants have further complicated this determination.  The following 
case is illustrative. 
In Chandler v. Multidata Systems International Corp.,2 the Panamanian 
plaintiffs3 included twenty-eight cancer patients overexposed to radiation 
during therapy at an oncology institute in Panama City, Panama.4  On October 
17, 2001, they filed suit in St. Louis County, Missouri,5 one corporate-
defendant’s domicile.6  Alleging that the defendants’ computer-operated 
treatment system erroneously calculated the dosages required for treatment, the 
injured parties (or representatives of the decedents) sought damages based on 
wrongful death and negligence.7 
 
 1 Abad v. Bayer Corp., 563 F.3d 663, 668 (7th Cir. 2009).  The Argentine plaintiffs in Abad were more 
than six hundred hemophiliacs infected with the AIDS virus from a clotting factor manufactured by the 
defendant-corporation in the United States.  Id. at 668–69.  The court subsequently dismissed the plaintiffs’ 
claims to Argentina, id. at 672–73, a civil law country that may refuse jurisdiction based on its interpretation of 
its own law.  Id. at 666. 
 2 163 S.W.3d 537 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005). 
 3 Two plaintiffs were actually U.S. citizens living in Panama, and two were U.S. residents.  However, 
the court did not treat this distinction as relevant.  Id. at 541 n.1. 
 4 Id. at 541. 
 5 Johnston v. Multidata Sys. Int’l Corp., 523 F.3d 602, 606 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 6 Chandler, 163 S.W.3d at 541.  The defendant was a Delaware corporation with its principal place of 
business in St. Louis County, Missouri.  Id. 
 7 Id. at 541–42. 
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The defendants immediately moved to dismiss for forum non conveniens 
(FNC),8 arguing that Panama was available as a more convenient forum in 
which to litigate the dispute.9  In response, the plaintiffs contested Panama’s 
availability; since they had properly filed first in the United States, the 
Panamanian court would not hear a dispute if dismissed for FNC.10  Thus, FNC 
dismissal was improper.11  Each side presented expert testimony in support of 
its position.12 
With the above case still pending, one plaintiff filed a petition in the San 
Miguelito Judicial District Court of Panama against the defendants.13  The 
court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction: 
Since the Panamanian Judicial Code follows the doctrine of “pre-
emptive jurisdiction,” once the [plaintiff] chose to file the complaint 
in the domicile of one of the defendants . . . , this Court of Justice and 
the Panamanian Court cannot and will never have jurisdiction over 
the defendants or over the subject matter of this case.14 
The plaintiffs presented this language to the Missouri court as further proof 
that Panama was unavailable for subsequent litigation.15  Rejecting this 
argument,16 the court granted the defendants’ FNC motion, but explicitly 
permitted the plaintiffs to refile in Missouri should Panama refuse 
 
 8 Forum non conveniens, a common law doctrine, permits a court to decline jurisdiction over a case 
when another forum is substantially more convenient for the proceedings.  See infra Part.I.A. 
 9 Chandler, 163 S.W.3d at 542.  In particular, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs lived and were 
injured in Panama, and most of the evidence and witnesses were there.  Johnston, 523 F.3d at 606. 
 10 Chandler, 163 S.W.3d at 544. 
 11 In a majority of courts, an FNC dismissal depends on finding that another forum exists for litigation of 
the dispute.  See infra Part I.B. 
 12 See Chandler, 163 S.W.3d at 542–45. 
 13 Josefina Escalante v. Multidata Sys. Int’l, Corp., Court Order No. 1922-03 (Pan. 1st Ct. J. Civ. Cir. 
Apr. 30, 2003) [hereinafter Josefina Escalante], excerpt available at http://www.iaba.org/LLinks_forum 
_non_Panama.htm. 
 14 Id.  The Panamanian appellate court affirmed this decision; the Supreme Court of Panama 
subsequently denied the defendant’s appeal for annulment.  Henry Saint Dahl, Forum Non Conveniens in 
Panama, INTER-AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.iaba.org/LLinks_forum_non_Panama.htm (last visited May 30, 
2011).  Because the U.S. case was ongoing at this time, the Panamanian court may have rested its decision on 
lites pendencia (lis alibi pendens), a civil law doctrine that precludes a plaintiff from suing a party against 
whom another suit is pending for the same incident.  See PETER HAY, RUSSELL WEINTRAUB & PATRICK J. 
BORCHERS, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES AND MATERIALS 207 (13th ed. 2009); see also infra note 119.  
However, the decision’s overly broad language suggests that the court would have reached the same outcome 
had the U.S. case already been dismissed.  See Josefina Escalante, supra note 13. 
 15 Johnston v. Multidata Sys. Int’l Corp., 523 F.3d 602, 606 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 16 Presumably, the court instead accepted the defendants’ argument that the plaintiffs intentionally filed 
the case in the wrong Panamanian venue (i.e., not the venue where the injuries occurred).  See id. 
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jurisdiction.17  In order to refile, the court noted, a Panamanian court of 
competent jurisdiction and venue must deny jurisdiction, even after learning of 
the defendants’ willingness to submit.18  On appeal, the Missouri Court of 
Appeals affirmed: the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Panama 
available because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate any sections in Panama’s 
Judicial or Civil Code prohibiting their refiling in Latin America.19 
Finally, on May 26, 2006, four of the plaintiffs refiled their claims in the 
Judicial District Court for Panama City, Panama.20  Relying on Article 238 of 
the Panamanian Judicial Code, the same plaintiffs then argued that the first 
court to hear a case “preempts and precludes the jurisdiction of the other 
courts,” and so the Panamanian court lacked jurisdiction.21  The defendants 
insisted that this doctrine of preemptive jurisdiction applies only to domestic 
cases; the plaintiffs argued for its international application.22  The district court 
agreed with the plaintiffs, holding that “preemptive jurisdiction dissolves 
Panamanian jurisdiction when the lawsuit is filed first in another country that 
has jurisdiction according to its own legal system.”23  In March 2009, the First 
Superior Court for the First Judicial District of Panama affirmed this ruling.24 
 
 17 Id. at 606–07 (citing Chandler v. Multidata Sys. Int’l Corp., No. 01CC-3634, slip op. at 2 (Mo. Cir. Ct. 
Jan. 8, 2004)). 
 18 Id. 
 19 Chandler v. Multidata Sys. Int’l Corp., 163 S.W.3d 537, 547 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005).  In its analysis, the 
court refused to consider the appellate decision rendered in Panama, see supra note 14, because that decision 
was not before the lower court.  Still, the court construed its applicable parts as dicta based on the Panamanian 
court’s finding that plaintiffs had filed in the wrong venue.  Chandler, 163 S.W.3d at 548.  Rather than appeal 
this dismissal to the Missouri Supreme Court, the plaintiffs immediately filed four new cases before the 
original U.S. circuit court.  They argued that the Panama Court of Appeals’ subsequent affirmation of its lower 
court’s dismissal, see supra note 14, satisfied the conditions imposed by the Missouri Court of Appeals for 
refiling.  The court rejected this argument, reiterated the requirements outlined by the Missouri Court of 
Appeals, and dismissed again without prejudice.  Johnston, 523 F.3d at 607. 
 20 Johnston, 523 F.3d at 607 n.1.  Prior to this filing, the plaintiffs also filed in federal court in Texas, 
which ultimately dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant.  Id. 
 21 Gilles Cuniberti, Preemptive Jurisdiction Trumps Forum Non Conveniens in Panama, 
CONFLICT OF LAWS .NET (Mar. 19, 2009), http://conflictoflaws.net/2009/preemptive-jurisdiction-trumps-
forum-non-conveniens-in-panama (internal quotation mark omitted).  At this point, the name of the case was 
Tobal v. Multidata Systems International Corp.  Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
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Most recently, on August 3, 2010, the Panamanian Supreme Court of 
Justice upheld these lower court decisions.25  While Article 259 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure grants Panamanian jurisdiction when the injuries occur in 
Panama, “the instant case should be viewed under the special rules of Private 
International Law” due to its numerous puntos de conexión, or international 
elements.26  The Court instead turned to Article 1421-J of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, a “special rule[] for the resolution of international disputes.”27  
Article 1421-J provides in full: 
In cases referred to in this chapter, national judges lack jurisdiction if 
the claim or the action filed in the country has been previously 
rejected or dismissed by a foreign judge applying forum non 
conveniens.  In these cases, national judges must reject hearing the 
lawsuit or the action due to reasons of a constitutional or preventive 
jurisdiction nature.28 
Accordingly, as held by the Panamanian Supreme Court, the Panamanian 
courts were barred from hearing the dispute based on the doctrine of 
preemptive jurisdiction.29 
Over the course of this litigation, both the United States and Panama have 
independently assessed the defendants’ fault in other contexts;30 yet both 
countries have repeatedly refused to oversee the injured parties’ claims.  To 
this end, the U.S. courts employed forum non conveniens, a common law 
doctrine permitting a court to decline jurisdiction over a case when another 
more convenient forum exists.31  A historical “gatekeeper” to the significant 
procedural and substantive advantages offered by the American legal system,32 
 
 25 Gilles Cuniberti, Panamanian Conflict Rules Trump Forum Non Conveniens, CONFLICT OF LAWS .NET 
(Aug. 16, 2010), http://conflictoflaws.net/2010/panamanian-conflict-rules-trump-forum-non-conveniens/ 
(analyzing and reprinting sections of the August 3rd decision of the Panamanian Supreme Court of Justice). 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 29 Id. 
 30 The Panamanian government requested two independent investigations, each concluding that the 
defendant’s equipment malfunctioned.  Based on these findings, numerous practitioners lost their licenses; two 
were criminally convicted of negligent homicide.  Chandler v. Multidata Sys. Int’l Corp., 163 S.W.3d 537, 
541–42 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005).  In the United States, the FDA enjoined Multidata from manufacturing and 
distributing medical devices.  Press Release, M2 Presswire, FDA Seeks Injunction Against Multidata Systems 
Intl. (May 8, 2003), available at http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-101438142.html. 
 31 See infra Part I. 
 32 See infra Part I.C.  As FNC dismissals most commonly occur against foreign plaintiffs bringing tort 
claims against U.S. defendants for injuries suffered in the plaintiffs’ home country, this scenario is assumed 
throughout this Comment. 
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this doctrine thus ensures that U.S. courts do not become havens for the 
“afflicted of the world.”33  Courts especially rely on FNC in the international 
context, to prevent foreign plaintiffs injured abroad from taking advantage of 
plaintiff-friendly U.S. tort laws, often applied to these disputes.34 
Yet FNC requires that another forum is available to hear the case; most 
often, this forum is the plaintiff’s home country, which the U.S. court has 
concluded will accept jurisdiction following its dismissal.35  However, unlike 
common law countries, civil law regimes recognize a preemptive system of 
jurisdiction, according absolute deference to a plaintiff’s choice of forum.36  
Perceiving FNC dismissals to compromise their jurisdictional system, many 
Latin American countries have recently held that they cannot accept 
jurisdiction over cases dismissed abroad for this reason.37  Some courts base 
this determination on their national codes of civil procedure; others rely on 
more recent legislation, or “blocking statutes,” enacted specifically to ensure 
this outcome.38  The refusal of either country to accept the other’s approach, as 
demonstrated above, creates “boomerang litigation” that ultimately leaves the 
plaintiff without any recourse. 
This Comment addresses the conflict presented by FNC dismissals to Latin 
America,39 so long as both the doctrine of FNC and blocking statutes persist.  
Thus, rather than decide the merits of FNC in general,40 this Comment seeks to 
 
 33 Russell J. Weintraub, International Litigation and Forum Non Conveniens, 29 TEX. INT’L L.J. 321, 
352 (1994). 
 34 See infra Part I.C. 
 35 See infra Part I.A–B. 
 36 See infra Part II. 
 37 See infra Part II. 
 38 This distinction and its implications are further discussed in Part II below.  However, this Comment 
otherwise treats these distinct modes of reasoning synonymously because they reach the same end.  For this 
reason, when this Comment discusses the effects of blocking statutes, it intends that discussion to refer also to 
“judicial retaliation,” wherein Latin American courts interpret their national codes of procedure to accomplish 
the same results as achieved by the blocking statutes. 
 39 It is important to note that U.S. courts do not actually dismiss for FNC to any other country or its 
courts.  See infra Part III.B.1.  Rather, the language “FNC dismissal to” is intended as convenient shorthand 
for an FNC dismissal that a U.S. court expects will result in the plaintiff’s refiling in a certain country (i.e., the 
country that the court has already identified as “available” for the litigation).  Having made this concession, 
this characterization is fair because a U.S. court must necessarily identify another forum for the litigation in 
order to grant an FNC dismissal.  See infra Part I.B.1. 
 40 This discussion has many contributors representing a range of perspectives.  Compare, e.g., 
Weintraub, supra note 33, at 352 (concluding that the elimination of FNC would make the United States “a 
magnet forum” and “place our companies at a world-wide competitive disadvantage”), with Winston 
Anderson, Forum Non Conveniens and the Constitutional Right of Access: A Commonwealth Caribbean 
Perspective, 2 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 51 (1993) (arguing that the doctrine of FNC raises a serious 
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reconcile the perceived needs of U.S. courts, reflected in their routine reliance 
on this doctrine,41 with the jurisdictional reality in Latin America.42  Part I 
presents the “competing” jurisdictional doctrines.  This Part first introduces the 
common law doctrine of FNC, paying particular attention to the policy 
implications of the modern formulation, before exploring the principles of civil 
law preemptive jurisdiction, including the recent blocking statutes purporting 
to codify these principles. 
Part II then discusses U.S. courts’ treatment of FNC motions to Latin 
America in view of these blocking statutes, both in practice and ideally.  In 
particular, Part II argues that these statutes reinterpret traditional civil law 
concepts, significantly affecting a U.S. court’s ability to dismiss for FNC.  
Failing to give this proper attention, numerous commentators have 
inadequately explained the responses of U.S. courts.  As a result, no proposed 
solution has satisfactorily accommodated the courts’ position alongside that of 
the plaintiffs.  Based in part on this analysis, Part III presents two theoretically 
distinct approaches to this problem, ultimately advocating for choice-of-law 
legislation in the United States, which most effectively acknowledges the 
courts’ concerns while ensuring the plaintiffs a forum in which to litigate. 
I. “COMPETING” JURISDICTIONAL DOCTRINES 
The idea that a court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction over a 
particular case, as embodied in the doctrine of forum non conveniens, is unique 
to the common law world.  In contrast, the civil law system of preemptive 
 
constitutional issue of access to the courts), and Dow Chem. Co. v. Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 680 (Tex. 1990) 
(Doggett, J., concurring) (deeming a specific application of FNC a “connivance to avoid corporate 
accountability”).  One of the most common criticisms of FNC is that it is too intolerable an obstacle to 
corporate accountability.  For various proposals to reformulate FNC, see Dante Figueroa, Are There Ways Out 
of the Current Forum Non Conveniens Impasse Between the United States and Latin America?, BUS. L. BRIEF, 
Spring 2005, at 42, 44 [hereinafter Figueroa, FNC Impasse] (acknowledging that certain modifications to the 
FNC doctrine are more realistic than “calling for an entire abolition” of the doctrine), and Dante Figueroa, 
Conflicts of Jurisdiction Between the United States and Latin America in the Context of Forum Non 
Conveniens Dismissals, 37 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 119, 161–66 (2005) [hereinafter Figueroa, Conflicts 
of Jurisdiction]. 
 41 See Walter W. Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Retaliatory Legislation: The Impact on the 
Available Alternative Forum Inquiry and on the Desirability of Forum Non Conveniens as a Defense Tactic, 
56 U. KAN. L. REV. 609, 609 (2008) (“A motion to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens has become 
the primary response of domestic defendants to tort actions brought by foreign plaintiffs in U.S. 
courts . . . [and is] granted[] in nearly every case.”). 
 42 While this Comment does not intend to decide the merits of FNC application in general, the doctrine’s 
ability to adapt to modern jurisdictional dilemmas speaks to its ongoing viability in the future of international 
civil litigation. 
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jurisdiction accords absolute deference to a plaintiff’s choice of forum.  
Section A discusses the development and modern application of FNC, with 
particular attention to the policy objectives FNC is intended to advance.  
Section B then introduces basic principles of civil law jurisdiction and 
discusses Latin America’s recent interpretation of these principles, as 
embodied in various blocking statutes. 
A. Forum Non Conveniens 
The doctrine of forum non conveniens (translating to “an unsuitable 
court”43) permits a court to dismiss a case over which it has proper 
jurisdiction44 when another adequate forum is substantially more convenient.45  
With longstanding common law roots,46 FNC plays a prominent role in the 
context of modern international litigation47 due to an increasingly global 
economy and the notable appeal of U.S. courts to foreign plaintiffs.48  This 
section provides an overview of FNC and its origins in the United States before 
outlining the doctrine’s modern application.  It then suggests an analytical 
framework for understanding the policy considerations FNC seeks to balance, 
which should guide our handling of the doctrine’s inadequacies in particular 
contexts. 
1. Origins and Overview of FNC in the United States 
The United States Supreme Court first recognized the FNC doctrine as such 
in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,49 although acknowledging its previous acceptance 
of the doctrine’s principles.50  In Gilbert, the Court appreciated that application 
of FNC was necessarily discretionary but identified a number of factors to 
 
 43 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 726 (9th ed. 2009). 
 44 The Supreme Court recently held that a court need not first establish jurisdiction over a dispute and its 
litigants in order to dismiss a case under FNC.  Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 
422, 455 (2007).  However, FNC dismissals are most common when a court otherwise has jurisdiction. 
 45 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 passim (1947). 
 46 The doctrine, first recognized in Scotland in 1866, is widely accepted in the common law world.  HAY 
ET AL., supra note 14, at 187. 
 47 FNC still exists within the United States for dismissals to state court (from both federal and other state 
courts); however, the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the federal transfer statute, has largely limited its use 
domestically.  HAY ET AL., supra note 14, at 208–09. 
 48 See infra Part I.C. 
 49 Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501. 
 50 Id. at 504 (“This Court, in one form of words or another, has repeatedly recognized the existence of the 
power to decline jurisdiction in exceptional circumstances.”). 
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consider in assessing the merits of an FNC dismissal.51  Gilbert contemplates 
two categories of factors—the first concerning the private interest of the 
litigant, and the second concerning the public interest, i.e., the convenience of 
the forum.52  Unless these factors strongly favor the defendant, however, a 
court should not disturb a plaintiff’s choice of forum.53 
The Court confirmed the enduring relevance of FNC in 1981 with its 
decision in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno.54  In Piper, the Court refined the 
proper application of the doctrine “crystallized” in Gilbert.55  Of particular 
significance, the Court held that “dismissal may not be barred solely because 
of the possibility of an unfavorable change in law.”56  In fact, this possibility 
should not even be given “substantial weight.”57  The Court reiterated the value 
of the doctrine’s flexibility and noted that such a holding would render the 
doctrine useless.58  Further, the Piper Court explicitly qualified the deference 
accorded a plaintiff’s choice of forum, as explicated in Gilbert: Because FNC’s 
central inquiry is the convenience of the parties, and because a foreign 
plaintiff’s choice of U.S. forum is less likely to be inspired by considerations 
of convenience, that choice is entitled to less weight than that of a citizen 
plaintiff.59  Thus, in combination, Gilbert and Piper provide the basis for 
modern FNC analysis. 
 
 51 Id. at 508. 
 52 Id. at 508–09. 
 53 Id. at 508.  The Court reiterated this sentiment in Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 330 
U.S. 518 (1947), decided the same day as Gilbert, but narrowed its discussion to the “good reason[s] why [a 
case] should be tried in the plaintiff’s home forum if that has been his choice.”  Id. at 524 (emphasis added).  
Thus, as early as Gilbert and Koster, the Court seemed to contemplate different treatments for domestic and 
foreign plaintiffs. 
 54 454 U.S. 235 (1981). 
 55 Id. at 248. 
 56 Id. at 249. 
 57 Id. at 247. 
 58 Id. at 249–50. 
 59 Id. at 255–56; see also Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas, S.A. v. Schichau-Unterweser, A.G., 955 
F.2d 368, 373 (5th Cir. 1992) (“When a plaintiff chooses a foreign forum for its claims, courts are reluctant to 
assume that convenience motivated that choice.”); C.A. La Seguridad v. Transytur Line, 707 F.2d 1304, 1307 
(11th Cir. 1983) (“A plaintiff who chooses a foreign forum substantially undercuts the presumption his choice 
is reasonable . . . .”). 
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2. Modern Analysis of FNC 
Most modern courts treat FNC analysis as a two-step process.60  To 
determine whether dismissal is proper, the court will first ask whether an 
adequate alternative forum exists.61  Characterizing FNC as a “doctrine 
furnish[ing] criteria for choice” between “at least two forums in which the 
defendant is amenable to process,” the Gilbert Court implicitly recognized the 
existence of an alternative forum as a prerequisite to FNC dismissal.62  Piper 
explicated Gilbert’s supposition in a footnote providing that a court must 
determine that an alternative forum exists “[a]t the outset of any forum non 
conveniens inquiry.”63  Once a court makes this determination, it proceeds to 
apply the factors outlined in Gilbert.64  Each step of modern FNC analysis is 
considered in greater depth below. 
a. The Threshold Inquiry: Availability of an Adequate Alternative Forum 
While “availability” and “adequacy” are often discussed jointly,65 they 
have developed distinct meanings, and courts increasingly treat them as 
separate inquiries.66  A forum is available when that forum has jurisdiction 
over all necessary parties and no procedural bar precludes the alternative forum 
from hearing the case.67  As a party’s consent is a valid basis for jurisdiction in 
every forum, a defendant’s submission to the jurisdiction of a foreign court 
renders that forum available.68  In contrast, a forum is unavailable where the 
 
 60 But see infra note 199 and accompanying text (discussing the treatment of an adequate alternative 
forum as one nondispositive factor in FNC analysis). 
 61 Walter W. Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Choice of Law: The Impact of Applying Foreign Law 
in Transnational Tort Actions, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1161, 1166 (2005). 
 62 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 506–07 (1947). 
 63 Piper, 454 U.S. at 254 n.22; see also Rajeev Muttreja, Note, How to Fix the Inconsistent Application 
of Forum Non Conveniens to Latin American Jurisdiction—And Why Consistency May Not Be Enough, 83 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1607, 1611 (2008) (noting the lack of attention accorded this inquiry by the Supreme Court, 
which assumed its existence in Gilbert and “relegated the issue to a footnote” in Piper). 
 64 Muttreja, supra note 63, at 1616. 
 65 See, e.g., Piper, 454 U.S. at 254 n.22. 
 66 Heiser, supra note 41, at 614. 
 67 Id. at 614 & n.34. 
 68 Anne M. Rodgers, Forum Non Conveniens in International Cases, in INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION: 
DEFENDING AND SUING FOREIGN PARTIES IN U.S. FEDERAL COURTS 205, 206 (David J. Levy ed., 2003).  For 
this reason, most courts condition FNC dismissal on the defendant’s submission to the alternative forum’s 
jurisdiction, as well as waiver of any statute of limitations defenses.  Id. at 216.  But see Leetsch v. Freedman, 
260 F.3d 1100, 1104 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a district court is not required to impose conditions on an 
FNC dismissal and “lack of such conditions does not render the . . . forum inadequate”). 
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forum “does not permit litigation of the subject matter of the dispute.”69  In 
short, a court is available unless it cannot or will not hear the case. 
Regarding adequacy, as previously discussed, an unfavorable change of 
law does not render an alternative forum inadequate.70  Only when “the remedy 
provided by the alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that 
it is no remedy at all” may the alternative forum itself be inadequate.71  For 
instance, in Parex Bank v. Russian Savings Bank,72 the court held that Russia 
was a “clearly unsatisfactory” forum in which to litigate claims based on a 
series of contracts that were not legally cognizable under Russian law.73 
Further, adequacy is necessarily a subjective inquiry.74  Perhaps for this 
reason, U.S. courts are notably hesitant to determine that another country’s 
court system is inadequate.75  First, only systemic prejudices or dishonesty 
provide appropriate bases for finding that a forum is inadequate.76  For 
instance, in Mercier v. Sheraton International, Inc., a U.S. court refused to 
consider the “personal difficulties” the plaintiff might face if the case were 
dismissed in favor of Turkey, because the plaintiff was unable to show any 
“legal or political obstacle to the presentation of [her] testimony in the Turkish 
courts.”77  In contrast, a Honduran forum was inadequate when the plaintiffs 
 
 69 Piper, 454 U.S. at 254 n.22. 
 70 See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text. 
 71 Piper, 454 U.S. at 254.  However, the alternative forum is not necessarily required “to offer a judicial 
remedy” in order to satisfy this requirement.  Lueck v. Sundstrand Corp., 236 F.3d 1137, 1143–45 (9th Cir. 
2001) (finding that New Zealand’s administrative remedy for plaintiffs’ product liability claims rendered that 
forum adequate). 
 72 116 F. Supp. 2d 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 73 Id. at 426–27 (quoting Piper, 454 U.S. at 254 n.22). 
 74 Figueroa, FNC Impasse, supra note 40, at 44 (“A forum is not adequate or inadequate per se.  Rather, 
it depends on the eyes of the beholder.”). 
 75 Heiser, supra note 61, at 1170. 
 76 This is true at least absent a “documented threat to the plaintiff’s safety or freedom.”  Rodgers, supra 
note 68, at 208. 
 77 981 F.2d 1345, 1350–51 & n.2 (1st Cir. 1992).  However, at least one court has considered such 
“personal difficulties” in weighing the private interest factors of Gilbert.  In Guidi v. Inter-Continental Hotels 
Corp., the Second Circuit held that the district court had abused its discretion in dismissing to Egypt for FNC 
in part because the district court ignored the “substantial and unusual emotional burden on Plaintiffs,” who 
were “widows or . . . victim[s] of a murderous act [in Egypt] directed specifically against foreigners,” if they 
were required to return to litigate their case.  203 F.3d 180, 186 (2d Cir.), amended by 224 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 
2000).  It is worth noting that the court’s discussion of the “ample evidence . . . giv[ing] credence to Plaintiffs’ 
uncertainty as to the safety of American visitors to Egypt” occurs in the context of the parties’ convenience 
(i.e., the private interest factors) rather than the availability or adequacy of the forum.  Id.  This reflects, more 
generally, courts’ cursory treatment of this threshold inquiry and caution in labeling an alternative forum 
inadequate. 
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presented evidence that the Honduran criminal process would be used to 
intimidate the plaintiffs’ officers and witnesses.78  Absent such express 
corruption or bias, however, procedural deficiencies including chronic delay or 
backlog, underdeveloped tort law, lack of capacity to handle complex mass tort 
litigation, and problems with enforcement of judgments are generally 
insufficient to render another forum inadequate.79  Thus, adequacy provides a 
fairly low threshold: as long as the plaintiffs are not “deprived of any remedy 
or treated unfairly” by the alternative forum’s legal system, that forum is 
adequate.80 
b. The Public and Private Interest Factors of Gilbert: A Balancing of 
Conveniences 
Having established that an adequate alternative forum is available for 
resolution of the dispute, the court then considers the Gilbert factors.  The 
purpose of the Gilbert factors is to properly balance conveniences—the court 
must consider the interest each party has in proceeding in a particular forum 
alongside the forum’s interest in litigating the dispute.81 
In evaluating the private interest of each litigant, the court should consider 
the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of 
compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of 
obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of 
premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other 
practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and 
inexpensive.82 
The ability of a foreign plaintiff to enforce a judgment rendered in the forum 
through his home court is also relevant to this inquiry.83  While a foreign 
 
 78 Honduran Aircraft Registry, Ltd. v. Honduras, 883 F. Supp. 685, 690 (S.D. Fla. 1995), aff’d in part 
and vacated in part, 119 F.3d 1530 (11th Cir.), and amended by 129 F.3d 543 (11th Cir. 1997).  For additional 
examples of systemic corruption rendering a foreign court inadequate, see Rodgers, supra note 68, at 208 n.21. 
 79 Heiser, supra note 61, at 1169–70 (discussing the litigation in In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant 
Disaster at Bhopal, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), resulting from a highly toxic gas leak at a Union 
Carbide chemical plant in Bhopal, India, that killed or injured more than 200,000 individuals). 
 80 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255 (1981). 
 81 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1947). 
 82 Id. at 508. 
 83 Id.  Interestingly, the ability of a foreign plaintiff to enforce a judgment rendered in the alternative 
forum in a U.S. court is not relevant to the inquiry and has, on occasion, become problematic following an 
FNC dismissal.  See Christina Weston, Comment, The Enforcement Loophole: Judgment Recognition Defenses 
as a Loophole to Corporate Accountability for Conduct Abroad, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 729 (2011). 
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plaintiff’s choice of forum is not entitled to the same deference as that of a 
citizen plaintiff,84 it is still given some weight.85  Further, that the defendant 
may be engaged in reverse forum shopping should not ordinarily affect the trial 
court’s analysis of the private interests.86 
In contrast, the public interest factors take into account the convenience of 
the forum.  At least one court has characterized these factors as a guide for the 
court in deciding whether to grant an FNC motion “when private equities are in 
equipoise, even with the extra deference accorded to plaintiffs’ choice of 
forum.”87  A court will consider the administrative difficulties it faces due to 
congestion of its dockets; the burden on its citizens posed by litigation 
unrelated to the forum; the local interest in having localized controversies 
decided at home; and the difficulties associated with application of foreign 
law.88  In this way, the doctrine of FNC aims to minimize the need for 
complicated choice-of-law analysis and, ultimately, application of foreign 
law.89 
The application of Gilbert factors is highly fact specific, and the Court has 
provided little guidance in terms of proper balancing.90  Due to the 
discretionary nature of this analysis, the trial court’s determination is subject to 
 
 84 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 85 See Piper, 454 U.S. 235.  A number of courts, however, including the Second Circuit, have held that 
when a treaty between the United States and a foreign nation affords both countries’ citizens equal access to 
the other’s court system, FNC analysis must treat foreign and domestic plaintiffs identically.  Rodgers, supra 
note 68, at 209 n.27 (citing Blanco v. Banco Indus. de Venezuela, S.A., 997 F.2d 974, 981 (2d Cir. 1993)). 
 86 Piper, 454 U.S. at 252 n.19.  This is premised on the idea that one forum is objectively better (i.e., 
substantially more convenient) than another forum and each party’s motive is not relevant to this 
determination.  But see Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 2001) (advising courts to look 
at the plaintiff’s “likely motivations in light of all the relevant indications” when determining how much 
deference to accord a plaintiff’s decision). 
 87 Pain v. United Techs. Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 784 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also Snaza v. Howard Johnson 
Franchise Sys., Inc., No. 3-07-CV-0495-O, 2008 WL 5383155, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 24, 2008) (“Only if a 
court concludes that dismissal is not appropriate based upon its review of the private interest factors, must it 
then weigh the public interest factors.”). 
 88 Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508–09. 
 89 See Heiser, supra note 61, at 1180–82 (interpreting the Court’s formulation of the FNC doctrine to 
encourage courts to dismiss for FNC in order to avoid a choice-of-law determination and application of foreign 
law). 
 90 Muttreja, supra note 63, at 1616–17. 
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a highly deferential standard of review.91  In effect, then, a higher court will 
rarely disturb the trial court’s decision to grant or deny an FNC dismissal.92 
3. Policy Considerations of FNC 
As stated by the Gilbert Court, “The principle of forum non conveniens is 
simply that a court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when 
jurisdiction is authorized . . . .”93  Relying largely on a law review article 
lamenting the congested dockets of New York courts,94 the Gilbert Court 
designated FNC as a tool to prevent plaintiffs from choosing an inconvenient 
forum to “vex, harass, or oppress” the defendant.95  Yet this narrow concern 
hardly explains the outcome in numerous cases in which courts grant an FNC 
dismissal when the chosen forum appears primarily inconvenient for the 
plaintiffs, not the defendants.  For instance, a foreign plaintiff’s decision to sue 
a defendant-corporation in the state of its headquarters is hardly an 
“oppressive” one, at least in terms of the defendant’s convenience in litigating. 
This outcome is largely explained by U.S. courts’ longstanding concern 
with forum shopping, “the practice of choosing the most favorable jurisdiction 
or court in which a claim might be heard.”96  A particularly useful definition in 
the international context, forum shopping is understood as a plaintiff’s 
“passing his natural forum and bringing his action in some alien 
forum . . . which would give him relief or benefit which would not be available 
to him in his natural forum.”97  The inherent assumption is that the litigant 
 
 91 Piper, 454 U.S. at 257 (“The forum non conveniens determination . . . may be reversed only when 
there has been a clear abuse of discretion . . . .”). 
 92 This outcome is criticized as highly problematic, both in terms of predictability and fairness.  For an 
interesting proposal to heighten the standard of review as to the preliminary question of whether an adequate 
alternative forum exists, see Alina Alonso & David L. Luck, Toward a More “Convenient” Standard of 
Review in Cases Involving Forum Non Conveniens Issues, FLA. BAR J., Jan. 2010, at 40.  The authors argue 
that this inquiry involves purely legal issues and questions of foreign law, usually reviewed de novo.  Id. at 
40–41.  The abuse of discretion review prescribed by the Piper Court thus pertained only to the lower court’s 
balancing of Gilbert factors.  Id. 
 93 Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 507. 
 94 Paxton Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 1 
(1929). 
 95 Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508 (quoting Blair, supra note 94) (internal quotation marks omitted).  “[A] 
plaintiff sometimes is under temptation to resort to a strategy of forcing the trial at a most inconvenient place 
for an adversary, even at some inconvenience to himself.”  Id. at 507. 
 96 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 726 (9th ed. 2009). 
 97 MICHAEL KARAYANNI, FORUM NON CONVENIENS IN THE MODERN AGE: A COMPARATIVE AND 
METHODOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 132 (2004) (alteration in original) (internal 
quotation mark omitted). 
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purposely overlooks a more appropriate forum in order to reap the benefits of a 
less appropriate forum.98 
Forum shopping is of particular concern in the United States due to the 
numerous procedural and substantive advantages offered plaintiffs by U.S. 
courts.  Many procedural and systemic advantages are, for the most part, 
unique to the American legal system.  These include extensive pretrial 
discovery, conspicuously plaintiff-friendly juries, the contingency fee system, 
large damage awards, and relatively efficient disposition and enforcement of 
judgments.99 
However, beyond advantages in procedure, perhaps the most appealing 
aspect of litigating in the United States is application of substantive U.S. tort 
law.100  U.S. tort law is grounded in strict liability rather than negligence, 
damage awards compensate for both economic and non-economic injuries and, 
on top of these, punitive damages are also available.101  As the majority of 
international litigation in the United States involves foreign torts,102 these 
features have the potential to seriously affect the outcome of a case.103  The 
lower costs of litigating coupled with the higher potential for recovery make 
the United States a “magnet forum” for foreign plaintiffs.104  FNC, then, is a 
judicial response recognizing that, in deciding where to file, a foreign 
plaintiff’s desire to litigate in the United States may overshadow important 
considerations of convenience. 
In particular, courts attempt to mitigate the consequences of forum 
shopping through measured application of the Gilbert factors.105  While trying 
to reconcile multiple, often incompatible interests—those of each litigant and 
 
 98 Id. 
 99 Heiser, supra note 41, at 618–19; Muttreja, supra note 63, at 1618; see also ANDREW BELL, FORUM 
SHOPPING AND VENUE IN TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION 29 (2003) (highlighting low filing fees, the possibility 
of class actions, liberal joinder rules, and relatively loose rules of pleading as further draws of the American 
system). 
 100 Of course, the underlying assumption is that a U.S. court will apply domestic law to the dispute.  
Heiser, supra note 61, at 1163.  For consideration of the correctness of this assumption, and its consequences, 
see infra Part IV.B. 
 101 Heiser, supra note 41, at 619. 
 102 Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L. REV. 553, 560 (1989). 
 103 See generally Henry Saint Dahl, Forum Non Conveniens, Latin America and Blocking Statutes, 35 U. 
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 21 (2004) (noting that due to numerous procedural deficiencies in Latin America, 
plaintiffs’ claims are less likely vindicated). 
 104 Russell J. Weintraub, Choice of Law for Products Liability: Demagnetizing the United States Forum, 
52 ARK. L. REV. 157, 162 (1999); Weintraub, supra note 33, at 352. 
 105 See supra Part I.B.2. 
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those of the forum106—courts simultaneously value these competing interests 
by according deference to the plaintiff’s choice of forum only when that choice 
stems from legitimate considerations.107  In resolving that choice-of-law and 
similar concerns are inherently illegitimate,108 a court may employ the Gilbert 
factors to protect against forum shopping and dismiss a case brought by a 
plaintiff who “unfairly exploits jurisdictional or venue rules to affect the 
outcome of a lawsuit.”109  The ability to dismiss these cases to a substantially 
more convenient foreign forum preserves judicial resources and protects the 
legitimate interests of the defendant.110 
If forum shopping were the only relevant policy concern, however, a 
court’s power to dismiss for FNC would be absolute.  Instead, FNC dismissals 
are limited in a significant way: a court may only dismiss a case when another 
forum is both available and adequate.111  This doctrinal formulation reveals a 
competing policy consideration, more valuable than a court’s ability to control 
its dockets or prevent forum shopping112—a plaintiff’s right to have his case 
heard.  As a result, a U.S. court should not dismiss a case over which it has 
proper jurisdiction—no matter how tangentially related to the forum—unless 
another court will hear that case. 
 
 106 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1947); see also Muttreja, supra note 63, at 1617–18 
(defining the “two distinct policy goals that can be aligned but are often in tension” as the court’s dual interests 
in “respect[ing] a plaintiff’s choice of forum” and “ensur[ing] that the trial is convenient”). 
 107 Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 108 Heiser, supra note 61, at 1168 n.33 (“[T]he more it appears that the plaintiff’s choice of a U.S. forum 
was motivated by forum shopping reasons . . . the less deference the plaintiff’s choice commands.” (second 
alteration in original) (quoting Iragorri, 274 F.3d at 72)).  Whether this is a fair assumption depends in part on 
one’s reading of Piper.  While the Piper Court discusses the need to alleviate the burden on American courts, 
“already extremely attractive to foreign plaintiffs,” Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 251–52 (1981), 
Piper seems to suggest that forum shopping is not, in itself, improper.  In fact, in reasoning that an unfavorable 
change in law is irrelevant to FNC dismissal, the Piper Court acknowledges without judgment that plaintiffs 
often “select that forum whose choice-of-law rules are most advantageous.”  Id. at 250.  This sort of forum 
shopping is only a problem if it leads the plaintiff to file in a substantially less convenient forum.  Thus, the 
appropriate question is not whether the plaintiff engaged in forum shopping, but whether the selected forum is 
most appropriate. 
 109 Juenger, supra note 102, at 553.  The forum shopping concern is thus premised on the idea that “the 
plaintiff screens the different jurisdictions and then decides to file suit in the forum that will grant the most 
favorable resolution of the pending dispute.”  KARAYANNI, supra note 97, at 132. 
 110 KARAYANNI, supra note 97, at 135. 
 111 See supra Part I.A.1. 
 112 If these considerations were equally valuable, deliberation of the Gilbert factors would not depend on 
finding another forum in which the plaintiffs could litigate. 
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B. Latin American Preemptive Legislation 
Basic principles of civil law jurisdiction are markedly different from their 
common law counterparts.  As FNC dismissals to Latin America become 
increasingly common, numerous Latin American countries have acted to 
counter the doctrine’s adverse effects on their legal systems.  Through “judicial 
retaliation” and “blocking statutes,”113 these countries attempt to hinder U.S. 
courts from dismissing for FNC cases brought by Latin American plaintiffs.  
This section introduces traditional principles of civil law jurisdiction and the 
blocking statutes supposedly based on these principles. 
1. Civil Law Preemptive Jurisdiction 
The concept that a court holds the discretionary power to dismiss a case 
over which it has proper jurisdiction is foreign to civil law regimes, which 
include most Latin American countries.114  In contrast to the common law 
tradition, the basis and scope of civilian judicial jurisdiction are established 
exclusively by national codes of civil procedure.115  These statutes appreciate a 
plaintiff’s initial choice of forum as absolute, so long as the plaintiff files in a 
court competent to hear the case according to both the civil law jurisdiction 
and the legal system in which the case is filed.116  Jurisdiction is generally 
proper in “the defendant’s domicile, the defendant’s place of business, and the 
place where the harm occurred.”117  If a plaintiff initially files in one of these 
places, then, under the Latin American rules of civil procedure, the court 
cannot decline to hear the case.118 
Because civil law gives categorical deference to a plaintiff’s choice of 
forum, a civil law court will decline jurisdiction over a claim initially filed by 
 
 113 See supra note 38. 
 114 Muttreja, supra note 63, at 1619.  Latin American civil procedure developed from various continental 
European systems and maintains the same basic principles.  RONALD A. BRAND & SCOTT R. JABLONSKI, 
FORUM NON CONVENIENS: HISTORY, GLOBAL PRACTICE, AND FUTURE UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON 
CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS 128 (2007). 
 115 BRAND & JABLONSKI, supra note 114, at 121 (“The concept of forum non conveniens is generally 
inconsistent with civil law systems in which there is a belief in the predictability of comprehensive procedure 
codes created by the legislature and the absence of all but minimal discretion in the role of the judge.”); see 
also Alejandro M. Garro, Forum Non Conveniens: “Availability” and “Adequacy” of Latin American Fora 
from a Comparative Perspective, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 65, 70 (2003). 
 116 E.E. Daschbach, Where There’s a Will, There’s a Way: The Cause for a Cure and Remedial 
Prescriptions for Forum Non Conveniens as Applied in Latin American Plaintiffs’ Actions Against U.S. 
Multinationals, 13 LAW & BUS. REV. AMERICAS 11, 29 (2007). 
 117 Muttreja, supra note 63, at 1620. 
 118 Id. at 1620 & n.75. 
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the plaintiff in another civil law court.119  In effect, then, the plaintiff’s 
decision to file in a particular court acts to strip all other civil law courts 
having concurrent jurisdiction of their right to hear the case.120  Still, most civil 
law jurisdictions recognize the plaintiff’s right to redirect the case to another 
competent court at his discretion.121  This choice, so long as made “freely, 
unequivocally, and voluntarily by the plaintiff,” revives the latter court’s 
jurisdiction.122 
2. Latin American Blocking Statutes 
Based on this preemptive system, many Latin American countries123 have 
recently decided that FNC dismissals have intolerable implications for their 
legal systems.124  While some rely exclusively on their national codes of 
procedure, many countries have enacted blocking statutes making explicit the 
perceived consequences of their jurisdictional rules125: Once a claim is validly 
filed in the defendant’s domiciliary court, the jurisdiction of the plaintiff’s 
 
 119 This concept is similar to, but distinct from, the civil law concept of lis pendens, which requires that 
one court stay proceedings on an issue being tried in another court.  See HAY ET AL., supra note 14, at 207.  A 
final FNC dismissal to Latin America would raise a lis pendens issue only if the U.S. court retained continuing 
jurisdiction over the suit.  Dahl, supra note 103, at 29.  However, as the Second Circuit made clear in In re 
Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, “Once a U.S. court dismisses . . . proceedings on grounds of forum 
non conveniens it ceases to have any further jurisdiction over the matter . . . .”  809 F.2d 195, 205 (2d Cir. 
1987) (characterizing the defendant’s suggestion otherwise as “not only impractical but evidenc[ing] an 
abysmal ignorance of basic jurisdictional principles”).  Thus, the basic justification for the Latin American 
blocking statutes must be the doctrine of preemptive jurisdiction rather than lis pendens. 
 120 Figueroa, FNC Impasse, supra note 40, at 44.  While this statement is accurate, the distinction made in 
the preceding sentence is important.  It is not the plaintiff’s actions that strip a second court of jurisdiction; 
rather, based on the civil law concepts of lis pendens and preemptive jurisdiction, the second court chooses not 
to accept the case.  See infra Part II.B.1. 
 121 Garro, supra note 115, at 70. 
 122 Id. 
 123 For the purpose of this Comment, Latin America refers to those Latin American countries having 
enacted some form of blocking statute, including Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, and Costa Rica, 
and others who have interpreted their national codes to the same end.  Collective treatment of these countries is 
appropriate due to the common origins of their statutes or interpretations—that is, Latin America’s civil law 
rules of preemptive jurisdiction.  For independent consideration of each regime, see Dahl, supra note 103, app. 
at 47–63.  Notably, many larger, more developed countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, do 
not have blocking statutes in place and have not construed their national codes to conflict with the FNC 
doctrine in the United States.  Michael Wallace Gordon, Forum Non Conveniens Misconstrued: A Response to 
Henry Saint Dahl, 38 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 141, 142 (2006). 
 124 See Dahl, supra note 103, at 21 (noting the “illegal effects” of FNC dismissals for Latin America). 
 125 For this reason, the term retaliatory legislation, which has emerged to describe these statutes, is a 
misnomer insofar as it suggests that the concept of preemptive legislation, in its entirety, is a response to FNC 
in the United States and like doctrines.  However, certain Latin American statutes specifically target “product 
injury cases brought by Latin American plaintiffs against U.S. defendants in U.S. courts, for torts arising out of 
the defendants’ activities in Latin America.”  Figueroa, FNC Impasse, supra note 40, at 45. 
SOLD GALLEYSFINAL 6/29/2011  1:36 PM 
1456 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60 
national court is effectively extinguished.126  Accordingly, once a Latin 
American plaintiff files a claim against a U.S. defendant in the United States, 
the plaintiff’s home court can no longer hear the case.127   
Nor does the equation change should the U.S. court dismiss for FNC.  In 
this instance, only the plaintiff’s voluntary refiling would revive national 
jurisdiction; however, the blocking statutes consider a plaintiff’s decision to 
refile in Latin America following an FNC dismissal abroad to be inherently 
involuntary.128  Rather, an FNC dismissal forces a plaintiff to refile and thus 
cannot revive jurisdiction of the Latin American national court.129 
For example, Parlamento Latinoamericano (the Latin American Parliament 
or Parlatino), an influential regional Parliament integrated from the national 
Parliaments of Latin American and Caribbean nations,130 enacted the Model 
Law on International Jurisdiction and Applicable Law to Tort Liability on 
January 27, 1998.131  Before introducing the text of the Model Law, the statute 
clarifies certain existing legal principles on which it rests—namely, that “the 
 
 126 See supra Part I.B. 
 127 Figueroa, FNC Impasse, supra note 40, at 44. 
 128 Dahl, supra note 103, at 24.  This is also the position of Parlatino’s Model Law, see infra text 
accompanying notes 130–36, so this stance is also assumed by those countries that follow it. 
 129 Id. at 24–25 (“FNC forces the plaintiff to re-file the case . . . [such that the] filing is not the product of 
the plaintiff’s free and spontaneous will. . . .  The plaintiff who re-files in Latin America . . . is compelled or 
coerced by the FNC order.” (footnotes omitted)).  Another Latin American response to FNC is the enactment 
of retaliatory legislation that extends jurisdiction to Latin American countries over cases dismissed abroad 
under FNC and permits them to import the law of the dismissing country in adjudicating the case.  Winston 
Anderson, Forum Non Conveniens Checkmated? The Emergence of Retaliatory Legislation, 10 J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. & POL’Y 183, 186 (2001) (noting that the legislatures in the Caribbean Commonwealth, where it was 
impossible to extinguish the jurisdiction of their national courts, enacted statutes permitting their local courts 
“to utilize the rules of evidence, liability, and award damages available to foreign courts”).  For instance, a 
Dominican statute “unreservedly accepts jurisdiction in a FNC situation.”  Dahl, supra note 97, at 24.  Thus, 
following a dismissal in the United States under FNC, the court might impose strict liability on an American 
corporate defendant, or subject the defendant to a determination of compensatory damages according to 
American standards.  Daschbach, supra note 116, at 57.  These statutes only become relevant once a case is 
dismissed abroad for FNC; thus, they operate less to “make Latin American courts a more appealing forum for 
Latin American plaintiffs” than to make Latin American courts a less desirable alternative for U.S. defendants.  
Id. 
 130 Muttreja, supra note 63, at 1623 n.87. 
 131 LEY MODELO SOBRE COMPETENCIA INTERNACIONAL Y DERECHO APLICABLE A LA RESPONSABILIDAD 
EXTRACONTRACTUAL [MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND APPLICABLE LAW TO TORT 
LIABILITY] art. 1 (Permanent Forum of Reg’l Parliaments for the Env’t & for a Sustainable Dev., Latin Am. 
Parliament 1998) [hereinafter MODEL LAW], available in English at http://www.iaba.org/LLinks_forum_non_ 
Parlatino.htm, translated in HENRY SAINT DAHL, DAHL’S LAW DICTIONARY/DICCIONARIO JURIDICO DAHL: 
SPANISH-ENGLISH/ENGLISH-SPANISH: AN ANNOTATED LEGAL DICTIONARY, INCLUDING AUTHORITATIVE 
DEFINITIONS 242 (4th ed. 2006). 
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choice of forum made by the plaintiff must be strengthened”132 and, citing to 
Article 323 of the Bustamante Code,133 that “in personal actions . . . the 
defendant’s domiciliary court [has] jurisdiction.”134  So premised, Article 1 of 
the Model Law states: “The petition that is validly filed, according to both 
legal systems, in the defendant’s domiciliary court, extinguishes national 
jurisdiction.  The latter is only reborn if the plaintiff desists of his foreign 
petition and files a new petition in the country, in a completely free and 
spontaneous way.”135  As discussed, a plaintiff’s refiling following an FNC 
dismissal abroad is not considered “free and spontaneous” for this purpose.136 
A number of Latin American countries, including Ecuador and Guatemala, 
have modeled their blocking statutes on this Model Code.137  Importantly, 
these statutes all share one thing in common: they explicitly intend to respond 
to, and to frustrate, FNC dismissals abroad.  As noted by the Parlatino statute, 
it “makes sure that . . . a foreign court with jurisdiction . . . will not be able to 
close the doors of the courts on [a Latin American plaintiff] as, for instance, 
has been happening with the theory of forum non conveniens.”138  Similarly, 
the Guatemalan statute states that “the ‘Theory of Forum Non Conveniens’ by 
foreign judges . . . makes it necessary to enact a law that controls the 
applicability of legal theories unknown in our system . . . .”139  It is in this 
context that U.S. courts must decide whether to continue dismissing to Latin 
America for FNC. 
 
 132 Id. at introductory cmt., translated in Dahl, supra note 103, app. at 47. 
 133 The Bustamante Code is an international treaty that attempts to codify conflict of laws.  Ratified by 
fourteen Latin American countries (and Cuba), the United States nonetheless refused to ratify it.  Alejandro M. 
Garro, Unification and Harmonization of Private Law in Latin America, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 587, 591–92, 
nn.16 & 17 (1992). 
 134 MODEL LAW, supra note 131, at introductory cmt., translated in Dahl, supra note 103, app. at 47. 
 135 Id. 
 136 See supra notes 127–29 and accompanying text.  Similarly, a plaintiff who refiles in Venezuela after 
an FNC dismissal does not “expressly or tacitly” submit to Venezuela’s jurisdiction, as required by Article 
40(4) of the Venezuelan International Private Law Statute (VIPLS).  Muttreja, supra note 63, at 1626.  Thus, 
Venezuela does not have jurisdiction over the case.  Id. 
 137 Ecuador’s statute was declared unconstitutional, as was part of Guatemala’s.  Dahl, supra note 103, at 
23; see supra text accompanying notes 184–86. 
 138 MODEL LAW, supra note 131, at introductory cmt., translated in Dahl, supra note 103, app. at 47. 
 139 Law for the Defense of Procedural Rights of Nationals and Residents, May 14, 1997 (Guat.), available 
at http://www.iaba.org/LLinks_forum_non_Guatemala.htm, translated in Dahl, supra note 103, app. at 48. 
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II. FNC MOTIONS TO LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES WITH BLOCKING 
STATUTES: AN EXPLANATION OF U.S. COURTS’ ANALYSES 
The message of these blocking statutes seems clear: A Latin American 
court will not hear a case dismissed abroad under FNC.  Yet U.S. courts reach 
inconsistent outcomes in determining whether a Latin American court is 
“available” for purposes of an FNC dismissal, as section A briefly discusses.140  
While numerous commentators have noted this inconsistency, few have 
adequately considered why certain courts insist on continuing to dismiss for 
FNC to Latin America, an outcome that seems obviously improper.  Instead, 
posturing these statutes as mere reiterations of foundational concepts in civil 
law,141 commentators assume that these decisions simply reflect the courts’ 
failure to appreciate crucial differences between the systems of jurisdiction, or 
refusal to accept the same. 
Section B argues that the results achieved by these blocking statutes are not 
inherent in traditional rules of civil law jurisdiction, largely explaining the 
hesitance of U.S. courts to accept that they can no longer dismiss to Latin 
America.  Instead, these statutes reinterpret civil law principles, ensuring that 
U.S. courts must deny FNC motions brought against Latin American plaintiffs.  
So portrayed, the courts’ discomfort with these statutes is easier to understand, 
and the need for a solution acknowledging the courts’ concerns becomes 
apparent. 
A. Actual and Ideal Treatment by U.S. Courts of FNC Dismissals to Latin 
America 
Whether a court will grant an FNC motion to a Latin American country 
with a blocking statute is largely unpredictable.  These statutes overtly intend 
to clarify that the Latin American country will not accept jurisdiction over a 
case once dismissed by a U.S. court for FNC.142  As FNC dismissal 
“presupposes at least two forums” in which a case may be heard,143 a U.S. 
court must decide whether these statutes effectively eliminate one forum.  
 
 140 For more exhaustive analysis of U.S. courts’ inconsistent treatment of FNC motions when faced with 
Latin American preemptive legislation, see Muttreja, supra note 63.  Muttreja argues for an “honest” 
application of the FNC doctrine, obligating courts to deny dismissals to Latin America.  Id. at 1607. 
 141 See infra note 170 and accompanying text. 
 142 See supra notes 138–39. 
 143 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947). 
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Latin American countries clearly intended for their blocking statutes to have 
this effect, as so concluding prevents a U.S. court from dismissing for FNC.144 
And many courts have indeed reached this conclusion, treating the blocking 
statutes as evidence that no alternative forum exists and refusing dismissal on 
this basis.  For instance, in Canales Martinez v. Dow Chemical Co.,145 the 
court relied on the Costa Rica Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) to hold that 
Costa Rica was not an adequate alternative forum.146  Article 31 of the CCP 
states: “If there were two or more courts with jurisdiction for one case, it will 
be tried by the one who heard it first at the plaintiff’s request.”147  By operation 
of plaintiffs’ filing in the United States, the court reasoned, CCP Article 31 had 
divested Costa Rican courts of jurisdiction.148  Further, Articles 122 and 477 of 
the CCP only recognize claims as valid if they are filed “freely and 
voluntarily”; by dismissing for FNC, “the [U.S. court] would be forcing the 
plaintiffs to try to file the lawsuit in Costa Rica in violation of articles 122 and 
477.”149  Thus, an FNC dismissal was inappropriate. 
The plaintiffs in In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.,150 where the court 
considered a motion to dismiss to Venezuela, succeeded with a similar 
argument.  Here, the plaintiffs asserted that, in combination, several provisions 
of the Venezuelan International Private Law Statutes (VIPLS) would preclude 
a Venezuelan court from assuming jurisdiction over their tort claim, once 
dismissed for FNC.151  Relying on the plaintiffs’ expert affidavits, the court 
rejected the defendants’ argument that defendants’ willingness to consent to 
jurisdiction in Venezuela was in itself sufficient to confer jurisdiction on its 
court.152  So finding, the court denied their motion for FNC dismissal.153 
 
 144 See supra notes 138–39. 
 145 219 F. Supp. 2d 719 (E.D. La. 2002). 
 146 Id. at 728. 
 147 Id.; see also BRAND & JABLONSKI, supra note 114, at 136. 
 148 Canales Martinez, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 728. 
 149 Id. 
 150 190 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (S.D. Ind. 2002). 
 151 Id. at 1131–32. 
 152 Id.  In particular, the following statutes were at issue: Article 39, providing the defendant’s domicile as 
the first forum for bringing suit; Article 40(2), relating specifically to jurisdiction in personal injury cases with 
nondomiciliary defendants; and Article 40(4), permitting Venezuelan courts jurisdiction over cases against 
nondomiciliaries if both parties submit to jurisdiction.  Id.; see also Carl Schroeter GmbH & KO., KG. v. 
Crawford & Co., No. 09-946, 2009 WL 1408100, at *7–8 (E.D. Pa. May 19, 2009) (discussing the In re 
Bridgestone/Firestone decision and concluding, in light of the Venezuelan legislation, that defendant failed to 
establish Venezuela as an adequate alternative forum). 
 153 In re Bridgestone/Firestone, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 1156. 
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Yet other courts have granted FNC dismissals on similar facts.154  In Rivas 
ex rel. Estate of Gutierrez v. Ford Motor Co.,155 a wrongful death action 
against Ford Motor Company resulting from a car accident in Venezuela, the 
court explicitly found the Bridgestone/Firestone reasoning unpersuasive.  
Instead, the court accepted defendants’ expert testimony to conclude that 
Venezuela’s courts were available for subsequent litigation.156  So too did the 
court in Morales v. Ford Motor Co.,157 another products liability case brought 
by Venezuelan plaintiffs against the American car manufacturer for an 
accident occurring in Venezuela.158  Despite expert affidavits indicating that 
plaintiffs’ decision to file first in the United States effectively stripped 
Venezuela of jurisdiction over the case, the court held defendants’ unilateral 
submission to the jurisdiction of the Venezuelan courts, alone, was sufficient to 
confer jurisdiction on Venezuelan courts.159 
The Morales court seemed particularly dissatisfied with the necessary 
implication of the plaintiffs’ argument: “Venezuelan plaintiffs have the option 
of rendering their home courts unavailable simply by bringing suits such as 
this one outside of their own country.”160  Other courts have echoed this 
sentiment, revealing a likely explanation for finding a Latin American forum 
available despite persuasive evidence to the contrary.  To determine that Latin 
American preemptive legislation precludes FNC dismissal “would place an 
undue burden on . . . courts forcing them to accept foreign-based actions 
unrelated to th[e] State merely because a more appropriate forum is 
unwilling . . . to accept jurisdiction.”161  In short, FNC initially developed “to 
 
 154 Many of these courts have conditioned dismissal on the alternative forum’s willingness to hear the 
case.  If the alternative forum refuses jurisdiction, the plaintiff can refile in the United States without prejudice.  
See, e.g., Abad v. Bayer Corp., 563 F.3d 663, 666 (7th Cir. 2009); Chandler v. Multidata Sys. Int’l Corp., 163 
S.W.3d 537, 547 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005). 
 155 No. 8:02 CV-676-T-17 EAJ, 2004 WL 1247018 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 2004). 
 156 Id. at *4.  The defendants had submitted additional expert affidavits and “learned from [key] mistakes 
of Bridgestone/Firestone.”  BRAND & JABLONSKI, supra note 114, at 138. 
 157 313 F. Supp. 2d 672 (S.D. Tex. 2004). 
 158 Id. at 677. 
 159 Id. at 676. 
 160 Id.  For more comprehensive coverage of these Venezuelan decisions, see Muttreja, supra note 63. 
 161 Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 467 N.E.2d 245, 249 (N.Y. 1984).  Unlike the other cases 
referenced here, this court considered FNC dismissal to Iran.  Based in part on the above-quoted reasoning, the 
court upheld the lower court’s dismissal in spite of Iran’s political situation under the Khomeini regime.  Id. at 
248, 250.  Importantly, however, the Pahlavi court acknowledged the possibility that no other forum existed 
and chose to dismiss anyway, id. at 250; the other courts, in contrast, did not consider the Latin American 
forums unavailable. 
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resist . . . imposition upon [a particular] jurisdiction”;162 blocking statutes 
appear to be just this imposition. 
However defensible this concern, these courts incorrectly apply the FNC 
doctrine to reach this outcome.  In doing so, they deny the plaintiffs a forum in 
which to litigate, appreciated by the Gilbert and Piper Courts as an absolute 
right.163  Thus, assessment of availability must proceed based on the foreign 
forum’s interpretation of its own rules rather than a U.S. court’s interpretation 
of the same.  If the purpose of the availability inquiry is to ensure plaintiffs 
have another forum in which to litigate, a U.S. court’s determination that such 
forum should be available is irrelevant if, in fact, that forum won’t be 
available.164  Nor is reliance on conditional dismissals in order to avoid 
properly analyzing the other forum’s availability consistent with the 
doctrine;165 a court that refuses to engage in a good-faith attempt of this sort 
invites unending litigation to the detriment of all involved parties.  Based on 
the current formulation of FNC and Latin America’s own understanding of its 
jurisdiction, then, a U.S. court should deny an FNC dismissal to Latin America 
because that forum is no longer available.166 
B. How Blocking Statutes Alter Traditional Civil Law Rules of Preemptive 
Jurisdiction in Latin America: An Explanation of U.S. Courts’ Behavior 
In view of the reasoning above, many commentators suggest that U.S. 
courts must simply accept these cases; the plaintiffs have nowhere else to go, 
and proper application of the FNC doctrine thus demands it.  To support this 
position, its advocates often assert that Latin America’s blocking statutes 
merely reaffirm principles of preemptive jurisdiction, a fundamental concept in 
civil law procedure.167  By implication, this conflict is unavoidable, and the 
U.S. court must forfeit certain rights—in particular, its right to decline 
jurisdiction—in the interest of comity. 
 
 162 Seales v. Panamanian Aviation Co., No. CV-07-2901 (CPS) (CLP), 2008 WL 544705, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 26, 2008) (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 163 See supra Part I.B.1. 
 164 Muttreja, supra note 63, at 1627–28, 1634–35 (“The American take on Venezuelan jurisdictional rules 
means nothing in Venezuela . . . .”). 
 165 Id. at 1634–35 (“U.S. courts . . . . have not always conducted a thorough inquiry into the alternative 
forum’s rules of jurisdiction, instead using conditional dismissals as a way to assume, rather than analyze, the 
other forum’s availability while hedging against the possibility of that assumption being wrong.”). 
 166 Heiser, supra note 41, at 625–26; Muttreja, supra note 61, at 1634–35. 
 167 See infra note 170 and accompanying text. 
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This section argues that this common conception of blocking statutes 
misrepresents their relationships to the original principles from which they 
derive.  Rather than merely reiterate traditional concepts of civil law 
jurisdiction, these statutes reinterpret these concepts to achieve a desired end.  
So recognizing reveals legitimate interests that some courts seek to protect 
through incorrect application of FNC.  Any potential solution must consider 
these interests in order to achieve an outcome that courts perceive as fair and 
are thus willing to follow. 
1. Latin American Blocking Statutes: Civil Law Jurisdiction Reinterpreted 
The prevailing view is that Latin American blocking statutes do nothing 
more than spell out existing law.  Parlatino, for instance, asserts that the 
purpose of its Model Law is “to clarify and to systematize” “two norms [that] 
are already incorporated in the majority of [Latin American] legal systems, but 
in a disperse way.”168  In citing to “classic Roman law” as the origin of these 
norms,169 Parlatino implies that this legislation merely reflects age-old rules of 
civil law jurisdiction.  Numerous academics concur, portraying Latin American 
blocking statutes as clarifying preexisting rules of preemptive jurisdiction 
rather than changing those rules.170  While these statutes are certainly premised 
on specific longstanding principles of civil law jurisdiction, this 
characterization at least oversimplifies the nature of these statutes and, in doing 
so, minimizes their effect on the outcome of cases facing FNC dismissal to 
Latin America. 
More accurately, these blocking statutes reflect certain interpretive choices 
on the part of Latin American legislatures such that they differ from, or at least 
expand on, their civil law origins.171  As discussed, Latin America’s construct 
 
 168 MODEL LAW, supra note 131, at introductory cmt., translated in Dahl, supra note 103, app. at 47. 
 169 Id.  Accordingly, a Latin American plaintiff resisting FNC dismissal will argue both that the relevant 
blocking statute prohibits his home court from assuming jurisdiction and, regardless, that his country’s 
codified doctrine of preemptive jurisdiction dictates the same result.  See, e.g., Paulownia Plantations de Pan. 
Corp. v. Rajamannan, No. A07-2199, 2009 WL 3644186, at *5 (Minn. Nov. 5, 2009). 
 170 See, e.g., Dahl, supra note 103, at 42 (“[T]he blocking statutes are not indispensable to dismiss cases 
filed in pursuance of a FNC order.  This is so because the illegalities of FNC . . . are more than sufficient to 
prevent jurisdiction from accruing, even without a law specifically making such point.”); Garro, supra note 
115, at 78 (“This statutory scheme appears not only unnecessary but also counterproductive.”); Muttreja, supra 
note 63, at 1620 n.74, 1623–24 (“Blocking statutes aim only to make a country’s jurisdictional rules clear; they 
do not actually change those rules.”). 
 171 This does not mean to imply that these statutes are the first or only incarnation of this interpretation.  
As previously discussed, courts have recently relied on their national codes to reach the same outcome as that 
SOLD GALLEYSFINAL 6/29/2011  1:36 PM 
2011] INAPPROPRIATE FORUM OR INAPPROPRIATE LAW? 1463 
of jurisdiction is founded on two central tenets of civil law jurisdiction: first, 
that jurisdiction is proper in a defendant’s domicile, and second, that a 
plaintiff’s filing in a court with proper jurisdiction is final—i.e., not subject to 
the court’s discretion—and thus another court will not accept the same case.172  
Based on these two principles, once a plaintiff files in a Latin American 
defendant’s domiciliary court, that court does not have discretion to dismiss 
the case, and all other Latin American courts relinquish their jurisdiction.173  In 
this way, one court’s loss of jurisdiction is premised on another court’s 
inability to dismiss a particular case.  Thus, it does not necessarily follow that a 
plaintiff’s filing in a U.S. court having such discretion, according to its own 
law, permanently extinguishes a Latin American court’s jurisdiction, the 
outcome achieved by these blocking statutes.  Reaching this conclusion 
requires an additional step—in this case, the active decision of a Latin 
American legislature to hold that its concept of preemptive jurisdiction applies 
extraterritorially as well, regardless of the foreign judiciary’s laws and concept 
of jurisdiction.174  In other words, a civil law jurisdiction’s refusal to recognize 
the FNC doctrine when applied by a common law court is separate from that 
jurisdiction’s inability to apply the same.175  The latter is inherent in 
longstanding principles of civil law; the former is not, and this is what the 
blocking statutes embody. 
Further, the traditional civil law rule that the plaintiff’s filing in one court 
terminates the jurisdiction of all other courts only applies so long as the 
plaintiff’s claim is pending before that first court.  Civil law jurisdictions—like 
common law jurisdictions—recognize the plaintiff’s right to change his mind, 
 
achieved by the blocking statutes.  See supra note 170.  Again, the term blocking statutes intends to encompass 
the discussion of this interpretative trend more generally. 
 172 See supra Part I.B.1. 
 173 See supra Part I.B.1. 
 174 BRAND & JABLONSKI, supra note 114, at 140 (“The Latin American experience indicates not only 
denial of any power to decline jurisdiction in national courts but legislative efforts to prevent U.S. courts from 
exercising such power under the forum non conveniens doctrine.”); see also supra text accompanying notes 
22–23.  This is not to say that Latin America’s decision is wrong—the United States continues to follow its 
tradition of FNC despite the fact that its application is problematic for other countries that do not recognize the 
doctrine.  The point is that portraying Latin America’s rejection of cases dismissed for FNC as an inevitable 
consequence of civil law jurisdictional principles ignores that Latin America has made certain affirmative 
decisions that depart from, or at least further develop, these basic principles. 
 175 For instance, a Nicaraguan court held “[its] procedural system does not recognize, and therefore it does 
not accept nor does it admit, the imposition of the Forum Non Conveniens Theory by foreign courts.”  Dahl, 
supra note 103, at 30 n.44 (quoting the Nicaraguan case of Reynaldo Aguilera Heute v. Shell Oil Co.).  This 
statement rests on unsound logic—namely, the assumption that acceptance of another country’s use of a 
doctrine depends on recognition of that doctrine within one’s own legal system. 
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to dismiss the case in one forum and refile in another.  Many blocking statutes 
acknowledge this, permitting revival of a court’s jurisdiction should parties 
submit “in a completely free and spontaneous way.”176  In interpreting these 
statutes, however, Latin American courts construe “free and spontaneous” to 
exclude any situation in which the plaintiff refiles following an FNC dismissal 
abroad.177  These courts reason that, in effect, an FNC dismissal coerces the 
plaintiff’s refiling such that his decision is forced rather than an act of his own 
free will, as required.178 
Of course, Latin American courts are permitted to so reason.  However, this 
reasoning is not intrinsic to civil law concepts of jurisdiction; rather, it relies 
on a particular characterization of the FNC dismissal and a specific (and 
idealistic) understanding of voluntary.  Each is a deliberate legislative choice 
enabling the desired outcome—the inability of Latin American courts to 
exercise jurisdiction over cases dismissed abroad for FNC. 
First, interpreting an FNC dismissal to “order” a plaintiff to refile plainly 
distorts the dismissal’s actual effect.  In reality, its only certain consequence is 
that a U.S. court will not hear the case.  By its terms, then, an FNC dismissal 
does not coerce or compel a plaintiff to do anything, including to refile in a 
Latin American court.  Holding otherwise requires two additional inferences: 
(1) that a plaintiff, left with the option to refile or have his claim unheard, will 
invariably choose to refile and (2) that a court, having left a plaintiff with this 
option, has compelled such refiling.  Certainly these are reasonable inferences, 
but they are by no means inevitable.  In view of the actual operation of an FNC 
dismissal, a Latin American legislature could just as rightly classify a 
plaintiff’s refiling as voluntary.  Similarly, the idea that “voluntary” inherently 
implies an action uninfluenced by any external force is both unprecedented and 
unrealistic.  Without this particular understanding of FNC and novel definition 
of voluntary, a plaintiff submitting to Latin American jurisdiction following an 
FNC dismissal would revive that court’s jurisdiction.179 
Two additional realities further compromise the assertion that blocking 
statutes merely reflect principles otherwise inherent in civil law jurisdictions.  
First, other civil law countries are willing to accept cases dismissed in the 
 
 176 See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 177 See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
 178 See supra notes 131, 133. 
 179 This forum is otherwise appropriate for jurisdiction, according to Latin American law, because it is the 
place where the harm occurred.  See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
SOLD GALLEYSFINAL 6/29/2011  1:36 PM 
2011] INAPPROPRIATE FORUM OR INAPPROPRIATE LAW? 1465 
United States for FNC.  For instance, based on the civil law tradition that 
originated in Europe,180 Brussels I prohibits any member of the European 
Union from dismissing for FNC.181  Yet, U.S. courts routinely dismiss cases to 
European countries,182 which do not interpret their jurisdictional systems to 
demand that they refuse these cases.183  In other words, these countries 
interpret their ability to dismiss for FNC (or lack thereof) as distinct from their 
ability to entertain cases dismissed elsewhere under this doctrine.  This, of 
course, suggests that Latin America’s contrary position is independent from, 
rather than intrinsic to, traditional civil law concepts. 
Further, more than one Latin American country has declared parts of the 
blocking statutes enacted by its legislatures unconstitutional.184  For instance, 
Ecuador enacted its blocking statute—an “Interpretive Law”—in 1998, 
explaining the purported operation of Articles 27 through 30 of its Code of 
Civil Procedure:  
Without prejudice to their literal meaning, [these] articles shall be 
interpreted in the sense that in case of concurrent international 
jurisdiction, the plaintiff may freely choose between bringing suit 
in Ecuador or in a foreign country . . . .  [but i]f a suit were to be 
filed outside Ecuador, the national competence and jurisdiction of 
Ecuadorian courts shall be definitely extinguished.185 
In April 2002, the Ecuadorian Constitutional Tribunal declared this statute 
unconstitutional “for reasons of form and substance.”186  It is difficult to 
 
 180 See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 2 (3d ed. 2007) (tracing the origins 
of the “civil law tradition” to “450 B.C., the supposed date of publication of the Twelve Tables in Rome”). 
 181 See Case C-281/02, Owusu v. Jackson, 2005 E.C.R. I-1383.  In Owusu, the European Court of Justice 
determined that Article 2 of the Brussels Convention precludes England, a common law country, from 
“declining jurisdiction” pursuant to FNC.  Id. at I-1459 to -1460.  Article 2’s grant of jurisdiction is 
“mandatory in nature”; an English court’s discretionary power to dismiss for FNC would undermine “the 
principle of legal certainty” sought by the Brussels convention.  Id.  However, this holding does not speak to 
the ability of a European court to hear a case dismissed by another court for FNC. 
 182 See, e.g., King v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 562 F.3d 1374 (11th Cir. 2009) (FNC dismissal to Italy); 
Baumgart v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 981 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1993) (Germany); In re Air Crash at Madrid, 
Spain, on August 20, 2008, 2011 WL 1058452 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2011) (Spain).  In none of these cases did 
the court consider—or the plaintiffs suggest—that the particular European country would not hear the case 
following an FNC dismissal, or was otherwise unavailable for its subsequent resolution. 
 183 See E-mail from Peter Hay, Prof., Emory Univ. Sch. of Law, to author (May 29, 2011, 11:24 CET). 
 184 In addition to Ecuador, discussed here, the Guatemalan Constitutional Court declared certain bond 
provisions imposed by its blocking statute unconstitutional.  Dahl, supra note 103, at 23 & n.12. 
 185 Id. at app. at 48. 
 186 Id. at 23; see also Jaime Arosemena & Hernán Pérez Loose, The Unconstitutionality of Law 55 and the 
Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine, INT’L L. OFFICE (July 30, 2002), http://www.internationallawoffice.com/ 
SOLD GALLEYSFINAL 6/29/2011  1:36 PM 
1466 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60 
imagine a statute that is simultaneously unconstitutional and identical to 
traditional civil law principles.  Instead, the statute’s unconstitutionality must 
lie in its departure from these principles, further calling into question the 
position that Latin American blocking statutes merely reiterate foundational 
principles of the civil law tradition. 
2. Implications of the Reinterpretations Embodied in the Blocking Statutes 
Latin America’s modern understanding of its own jurisdiction, whether 
based on its national codes or more recent blocking statutes, reflects at least an 
evolution from, rather than reincarnation of, basic civil law principles.  While 
this distinction may seem largely immaterial, it helps to explain the resistance 
of many U.S. courts to the outcome seemingly mandated by this legislation—
that is, denial of an FNC dismissal to Latin America.187  Rather than an 
inevitable consequence of two fundamentally different conceptions of 
jurisdiction, this outcome appears a strategic attempt to force jurisdiction onto 
the United States.188  Posited as the former, a court’s decision to grant an FNC 
dismissal despite a blocking statute appears to be an offensive affront, or an 
intolerant attempt to force its common law jurisprudence on Latin America; 
viewed as the latter, however, this decision becomes a primarily defensive 
maneuver intended to protect the courts’ legitimate interests, embodied by the 
FNC doctrine. 
Further, regardless of whether concepts of preemptive jurisdiction 
otherwise dictate this result, Latin American legislatures enacted the blocking 
statutes with the express purpose of frustrating U.S. courts’ attempts to dismiss 
for FNC.189  At least arguably, this alone justifies the courts’ opposition: the 
statutes seem to permit foreign plaintiffs, sanctioned by their national 
governments, to take advantage of the U.S. judicial system without regard to 
the burden placed on its courts or taxpayers.  More problematic, the Latin 
American plaintiffs unilaterally hold the power to render their national courts 
 
newsletters/detail.aspx?g=dcf7e15e-f706-407a-aea0-0b3810468427 (“The rush to enact Law 55 caused both 
formal and hierarchical violations to the Ecuadorian Constitution.”). 
 187 See supra Part II.A. 
 188 Again, Latin America is allowed to interpret its own law however it wishes; FNC may equally be 
viewed as a strategic attempt to force litigation on another country.  However, understanding that the outcome 
dictated by blocking statutes is due the legislatures’ interpretation of civil law principles, rather than those 
principles themselves, better explains U.S. courts’ behavior and allows for a solution that accommodates their 
interests. 
 189 See supra notes 138–39 and accompanying text. 
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unavailable.  Filing first in Latin America, they may assuredly litigate there;190 
filing first in the United States, the plaintiffs know that a court cannot 
dismiss.191  Should the U.S. court conditionally dismiss anyway, the plaintiffs 
can file in Latin America and then argue against that court’s jurisdiction, thus 
guaranteeing that the Latin American court finds the refiling involuntary and 
denies jurisdiction on that account.192  The plaintiffs can subsequently return to 
the United States, having satisfied the conditions for refiling.193 
In combination, the perceived reasons why Latin American countries 
enacted these statutes and their implications for U.S. courts have led some U.S. 
courts to manipulate their FNC analyses to more satisfying (and self-serving) 
ends.  As long as these courts perceive the statutes to encourage abuse of their 
system, however accurately, they will likely persist in misapplying FNC to 
achieve an outcome that feels fairer.  As a result, U.S. courts will continue to 
dismiss the claims of Latin American plaintiffs to courts unable or unwilling to 
entertain them. 
III.  POTENTIAL AND IDEAL U.S. RESPONSES TO LATIN AMERICAN PREEMPTIVE 
LEGISLATION 
Recognizing the legitimacy of the U.S. courts’ concerns is important in 
determining whether, and how, to respond to this situation.  Those 
commentators that suggest courts must simply accept this litigation ensure the 
plaintiff’s access to a court only by disregarding entirely that court’s interests.  
Further, they fail to appreciate the improbability of a court’s adherence to a 
proposal that is so against its self-interest.  Instead, some courts will continue 
 
 190 Assuming that the plaintiff’s injury occurred in his home country.  See supra note 120 and 
accompanying text. 
 191 This statement assumes that U.S. courts are staying true to the FNC doctrine, which, as discussed, is 
not always the case.  See supra Part II.A. 
 192 See supra text accompanying notes 21–23. 
 193 Recognizing this, the Florida Court of Appeals requires that a plaintiff make a good-faith effort to 
carry out the FNC dismissal order in Latin America.  See Scotts Co. v. Hacienda Loma Linda, 2 So. 3d 1013, 
1015–17 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).  In Scotts Co., the Florida court conditioned its FNC dismissal on the 
plaintiff’s ability to refile in Panana.  When it refiled, the plaintiff emphasized to the Panamanian court that the 
United States had previously dismissed the case for FNC, and failed to submit to jurisdiction in Panama or to 
request that Panama’s blocking statute not apply.  On “appeal,” the plaintiff then asked for affirmation of the 
lower court’s ruling.  When the case returned to Florida, the court refused to proceed based on the plaintiff’s 
attempt to manipulate its jurisdiction.  1 VED P. NANDA & DAVID K. PANSIUS, LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS § 6:15 (2d ed. 2010). 
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to misapply the FNC doctrine, which will neither lessen initial filings in the 
United States194 nor guarantee plaintiffs a court in which to litigate. 
For this reason, the United States should respond in some way.195  The 
United States can assume one of two theoretically distinct approaches,196 either 
(1) further manipulating the FNC doctrine to permit dismissal of cases brought 
by Latin American plaintiffs despite their nations’ blocking statutes, or (2) 
targeting the underlying source of the conflict—the allure of U.S. courts to 
foreign litigants with cases more appropriately heard by the courts of their 
home countries.197  The following section explores the practicability of each 
option, as well as their advantages and disadvantages.  Ultimately, this 
Comment dismisses the first option because it prioritizes the courts’ interests 
over those of the plaintiffs.  This Comment concludes that the second option 
most effectively reconciles a court’s efficiency and forum-shopping concerns 
with a plaintiff’s right to litigate his case. 
 
 194 This is because, as long as U.S. courts treat FNC motions to Latin America inconsistently, there is 
sufficient incentive for Latin American plaintiffs to continue filing in the United States for its numerous 
benefits.  See supra Part I.C. 
 195 More than one commentator has argued that international measures are most appropriate for this 
conflict.  See Daschbach, supra note 116, at 61–65 (discussing the development of a new multilateral treaty, 
the expansion of an existing treaty, and the establishment of an international tribunal as potentially viable 
means to address this problem); Figueroa, Conflicts of Jurisdiction, supra note 40, at 124 (concluding that 
bilateral treaties between the United States and Latin American countries are “the natural way out of the FNC 
impasse” and would have numerous positive effects); Figueroa, FNC Impasse, supra note 40, at 46 (“The best 
mechanism for solving the FNC impasse would be an international treaty between the United States and most 
Latin American countries.”). 
 196 Theoretically, a third approach would be for U.S. courts to narrow their concept of personal 
jurisdiction so as to avoid triggering Latin American blocking statutes in the first place.  Because Latin 
America’s system of preemptive jurisdiction treats a plaintiff’s initial choice of forum as conclusive only if the 
plaintiff filed in a court competent to hear the case according to both legal systems, see supra note 116, a 
plaintiff’s initial filing in a U.S. court without proper jurisdiction would not extinguish the jurisdiction of its 
home court.  However, as the majority of these cases involve transnational tort claims against U.S. 
corporations, typically at least one U.S. court will have proper jurisdiction over the defendant.  In order to find 
lack of personal jurisdiction over the Latin American plaintiff, then, a U.S. court would have to consider the 
plaintiff’s submission alone to be insufficient for this purpose.  So holding would seriously change basic 
principles upon which the United States’ current conception of jurisdiction rests.  Further, this interpretation 
would likely raise constitutional issues based on the U.S. Constitution’s guarantee to all “persons”—as 
opposed to “citizens”—equal protection and due process.  See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.  Manipulating 
jurisdiction in this way would therefore have consequences far greater than the problem it seeks to solve. 
 197 See Heiser, supra note 61, at 1163 (“[T]he assumption . . . is that a court in the United States will apply 
domestic law in a transnational tort case.” (footnote omitted)). 
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A. Further Manipulation of FNC to Permit Dismissals Despite Latin 
American Blocking Statutes 
As discussed above, a correct interpretation of the current FNC doctrine 
requires that a U.S. court refuse to dismiss a case under FNC when (1) the case 
is brought by a Latin American plaintiff, (2) the potential alternative forum is 
that plaintiff’s home country, and (3) that country has a blocking statute 
terminating the jurisdiction of its courts over cases dismissed abroad under 
FNC.  While some courts have correctly applied the doctrine and accepted 
jurisdiction over these cases, a number of courts have instead determined that 
an alternative forum exists, despite persuasive evidence to the contrary, and 
dismissed accordingly.  The inconsistent outcomes are problematic because 
they neither lessen initial filings in the United States nor guarantee the plaintiff 
a forum in which to bring his claim.198 
In order to avoid straining the existing doctrine, ensure consistency, and 
prevent forum shopping, U.S. courts may choose to reconsider the definition of 
an adequate alternative forum or its role in FNC analysis.  For instance, in a 
different context, more than one court has held that, rather than a “precondition 
to dismissal,” “the availability of another suitable forum is a most important 
factor” in granting FNC dismissal.199  If an adequate alternative forum were a 
balancing factor rather than a prerequisite inquiry, its absence would not 
preclude a court from continuing to the second prong of FNC analysis.200  
Instead, such availability—or lack thereof—would be considered in 
combination with the other public and private factors of Gilbert.201 
To the same end, courts could redefine adequate alternative forum to 
denote a jurisdiction that would have been available had the plaintiffs filed 
 
 198 See supra Part I.B.3 (noting the continued appeal of U.S. courts so long as U.S. law remains an 
option). 
 199 Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 467 N.E.2d 245, 248–50 (N.Y. 1984) (tracing the origins of this 
“perceived requirement” to dicta in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947)); see also Shin-Etsu Chem. 
Co. v. 3033 ICICI Bank Ltd., 777 N.Y.S.2d 69, 75 (App. Div. 2004) (construing the availability of an 
alternative forum as “an important consideration” but not a “precondition to dismissal”); Moenzina v. 
Moenzina, 507 N.Y.S.2d 716, 717 (App. Div. 1986); Broukhim v. Hay, 504 N.Y.S.2d 467, 468 (App. Div. 
1986).  But see Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 n.22 (1981) (characterizing the availability of 
an alternative forum as an “initial requirement” to FNC dismissal); Paulownia Plantations de Pan. Corp. v. 
Rajamannan, 757 N.W.2d 903, 907 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (“[A] determination of the availability and 
adequacy of the alternative forum is implicit in the Hague decision.”).  While this is “very much a minority 
approach today,” it stands to become more popular if additional countries enact blocking statutes.  Heiser, 
supra note 41, at 658–59. 
 200 See supra Part I.B.1. 
 201 Muttreja, supra note 63, at 1641. 
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there initially, or one that “could have jurisdiction if its legislators so 
decided.”202  In doing so, FNC dismissal would remain inappropriate when the 
alternative forum was either inadequate or unavailable from the beginning—
for instance, due to rampant corruption in the national courts or nonrecognition 
of the plaintiff’s cause of action.203  However, where a court’s jurisdiction was 
extinguished solely as a result of the foreign plaintiffs’ strategic choice to file 
first in the United States, a U.S. court could correctly assert that the foreign 
court remains an adequate alternative.  In effect, both approaches manipulate 
the FNC doctrine to “block” the blocking statutes. 
This approach adequately responds to the courts’ forum shopping concerns, 
discussed in Parts I.A.3 and II.B, which underlie their inconsistent treatment.  
In particular, finding a court adequate despite a blocking statute effectively 
eliminates the potential for foreign plaintiffs to forum shop in the United States 
and the ability of Latin American legislation to facilitate this forum shopping.  
If U.S. courts dismissed for FNC without attention to the presence of blocking 
statutes or their effects, Latin American plaintiffs would have no incentive to 
file here in the first place.  The plaintiffs could file initially in their home 
courts, which would have proper jurisdiction over their claims. 
To the extent our primary concern, then, is U.S. courts’ misapplication of 
FNC as a response to Latin American preemptive legislation, either approach 
is a satisfactory response.  However, Latin American courts do not care 
whether U.S. courts have rightly dismissed a case under their own FNC 
doctrine, nor do they care whether the U.S. court considers its dismissal to 
meet the standards of that Latin American court.204  Thus, correct application 
of this reworked FNC doctrine precipitates the same problematic outcome as 
incorrect application of the existing doctrine: a foreign plaintiff, his case 
dismissed abroad under FNC, has no other forum in which to litigate.  A 
necessary corollary, the tortious conduct of U.S. defendants abroad becomes, 
in essence, immune from suit. 
Perhaps one could argue that insistent denial of Latin American plaintiffs’ 
access to U.S. courts through FNC, regardless of another forum’s availability, 
may pressure Latin American countries to abandon these blocking statutes to 
 
 202 Gordon, supra note 123, at 155–56. 
 203 See supra Part I.B.1. 
 204 See Muttreja, supra note 63, at 1630 (suggesting that “[a] U.S. court’s independent interpretation of 
foreign rules . . . is much less appropriate when it runs contrary to foreign authority,” particularly because the 
purpose of “the FNC availability inquiry is to predict what a foreign court . . . will do”). 
SOLD GALLEYSFINAL 6/29/2011  1:36 PM 
2011] INAPPROPRIATE FORUM OR INAPPROPRIATE LAW? 1471 
ensure their citizens some form of justice.  However, if these countries truly 
view this legislation as based on constitutional principles or otherwise inherent 
in their civil codes, this outcome is highly unlikely.  Further, even if FNC 
dismissals could provoke this sort of change within Latin American countries, 
this approach treats the first generation of dismissed plaintiffs, whose claims 
will subsequently go unheard, as necessary casualties to the doctrinal conflict 
between the United States and Latin America. 
Most importantly, an FNC dismissal is not a “judicial right”205 but depends 
on the availability of another forum.206  This requirement is not 
inconsequential; rather, it reflects a policy consideration of foremost 
importance.207  To disregard this analysis, in either application208 or effect,209 is 
to seriously deviate from the doctrine imagined in Gilbert and Piper.  
Requiring a U.S. court to unreservedly accept this litigation overlooks the 
interests of that court in favor of the plaintiff’s right to a forum; however, 
permitting a court to dismiss this litigation without finding that another court 
exists improperly sacrifices the plaintiff’s interest to appease the court’s 
concerns.  An ideal solution, then, will consider each participant’s interest and 
seek to accommodate both. 
B. Choice-of-Law Legislation to Target the Source of the Problem 
Choice-of-law legislation is this solution.  As discussed in Part I.C above, 
foreign litigants are attracted to U.S. courts for a number of procedural, 
systemic, and substantive reasons.  The foremost enticement is the potential for 
a U.S. court to apply domestic law to the dispute.210  As most of these cases 
involve transnational tort claims, the outcome of the case, both in terms of 
liability and damages, depends largely on what law is applied.  Thus, even 
though application of U.S. law is not assured, its possibility creates sufficient 
incentive for foreign plaintiffs to forgo the convenience of litigating at 
home.211 
 
 205 Id. at 1626. 
 206 See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text. 
 207 The importance of this consideration is underscored, rather than tempered, by the fact that the Court 
took for granted the existence of an alternative forum in the two seminal cases on FNC. 
 208 That is, by interpreting availability as a nondispositive factor for FNC dismissal.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 199–201. 
 209 That is, by construing as available a forum that, according to its own law, will not hear the case. 
 210 See Heiser, supra note 61, at 1163. 
 211 See id. 
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The expectations of these plaintiffs are often met.  According to one study, 
the “modern conflicts systems tend to favor the application of forum law.”212  
Thus, most courts in the United States that adhere to modern choice-of-law 
principles will apply their own substantive law, regardless of the plaintiffs’ 
nationality or the place of injury.213  Other courts following the traditional 
choice-of-law approach will likely apply foreign law to the same dispute.214  
Inconsistent application of substantive law to these transnational tort claims 
fuels their continued filing in the United States.  Further, internal judicial 
resolution is unlikely because choice of law is fact specific and its application 
is thus discretionary. 
Against this backdrop, legislation mandating application of foreign law 
most effectively reconciles the interests of the courts and plaintiffs by ensuring 
the plaintiffs a U.S. forum in which to litigate but lessening their incentive to 
do so.  This Comment first establishes the suitability of such choice-of-law 
legislation in view of both constitutional imperatives and courts’ doctrinal 
preferences.  Next, this Comment explores how this course of action better 
balances the competing concerns that other potential solutions fail to 
reconcile—namely, the legitimate resistance of courts to forum shopping and 
the rights of plaintiffs to a forum. 
1. Appropriateness of Application of Foreign Law 
The Supreme Court explicated the constitutional standard for choice-of-law 
determinations in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague: “[A] choice-of-law decision 
would violate the Due Process Clause if it were totally arbitrary or if it were 
fundamentally unfair to either litigant.”215  The Court went on to recognize that 
application of the law of any state having “significant contact or significant 
aggregation of contacts, creating state interests” likely meets this low 
threshold.216  Because FNC dismissals similarly require a finding of significant 
contacts with the foreign forum—in fact, contacts more significant than those 
with the United States—mandatory application of foreign law to the narrow 
 
 212 Id. at 1163 n.9 (citing Patrick J. Borchers, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: An Empirical Study, 49 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 357, 377–78 (1992)).  Modern choice-of-law rules are reflected in the RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971). 
 213 See Heiser, supra note 61, at 1163–64. 
 214 See infra notes 217–18 and accompanying text. 
 215 449 U.S. 302, 326 (1981). 
 216 See id. at 313. 
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class of cases discussed above necessarily comports with the Court’s 
articulation of due process. 
In fact, traditional choice-of-law doctrine would likely advocate for 
application of foreign law.  For tort cases, courts still following this approach, 
embodied by the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws, will usually apply 
“[t]he law of the place of wrong,” or the place “where the last event necessary 
to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place.”217  In most situations, 
this is the place of the plaintiff’s injury.218  Latin American law would thus 
apply to any claim brought by a Latin American plaintiff against a U.S. 
defendant for an injury sustained in the plaintiff’s home country.  The 
plaintiff’s selection of forum thus becomes irrelevant for choice-of-law 
purposes.  Theoretically, then, a Latin American plaintiff has significantly less 
incentive to file in a U.S. court following the traditional approach to choice of 
law.219 
On the other hand, modern choice-of-law doctrine often favors application 
of forum law.220  However, it also recognizes that statutory directives, whether 
expressly or indirectly legislated, will trump traditional choice-of-law 
principles.221  This widely accepted concept recognizes that a legislature may 
view choice-of-law legislation as a means by which to achieve specific policy 
objectives, and this legislative decision deserves deference.  Thus, even were 
application of domestic law preferable according to modern choice-of-law 
rules, a legislature could still require application of foreign law for any number 
of policy reasons. 
Further, application of foreign law to those cases eligible for FNC 
dismissal is not inconsistent with modern choice-of-law doctrine.  The 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws advocates only for a more case-
specific approach to choice-of-law determinations.  Accordingly, section 6 
 
 217 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377–78 (1934). 
 218 The common conception is that there is no tort absent an injury to someone or something. 
 219 See supra notes 100, 197. 
 220 See Joseph William Singer, A Pragmatic Guide to Conflicts, 70 B.U. L. REV. 731, 743 (1990) (“Judges 
do have a strong tendency to apply forum law when they can.”). 
 221 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(1) (1971) (“A court, subject to constitutional 
restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice of law.”); id. § 6 cmt. b ( “[T]he court 
[should] apply a local statute in the manner intended by the legislature even when the local law of another state 
would be applicable under usual choice-of-law principles.”). 
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points to a list of factors relevant to any choice-of-law decision,222 including 
“the relevant policies of the forum”223 and “the relevant policies of other 
interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of 
the particular issue.”224  Arguably, a Latin American forum has some interest 
in the regulation of a foreign corporation within its borders, deterrence of the 
corporation’s tortious conduct, and compensation of its injured citizens.225  Of 
equal import, a U.S. court has a strong interest in preventing foreign plaintiffs 
from exploiting the U.S. legal system for its numerous advantages.  To the 
extent that application of foreign law would lessen this exploitation in 
situations where FNC could not, policy reasons actually favor such application. 
For tort claims in particular, section 145 of the Restatement (Second) 
identifies the applicable law as that of the state having “the most significant 
relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in 
§ 6.”226  Relevant considerations include “(a) the place where the injury 
occurred, (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (c) the 
domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of 
the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties 
is centered.”227  Where a plaintiff sustains an injury in his state of citizenship 
or residency due to the defendant’s conduct within that state,228 as in most tort 
cases brought by Latin American plaintiffs in the United States, there is a 
strong argument that this state’s relationship to the occurrence and the parties 
 
 222 Section 6 is the “cornerstone” of the Restatement, outlining the policies and values that should underlie 
every choice-of-law decision.  PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS & SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CONFLICT OF 
LAWS 63 (5th ed. 2010). 
 223 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2)(b) (1971). 
 224 Id. § 6(2)(c).  Another relevant factor is “ease in the determination and application of the law to be 
applied,” which clearly favors application of domestic law.  Id. § 6(2)(g).  See infra text accompanying note 
236. 
 225 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 cmt. b (1971) (suggesting that the relative 
interests of each forum are even more important to choice-of-law determinations in tort cases due to the 
relative insignificance of other factors listed in section 6).  This is not to say that the United States has no 
interest in similarly regulating the international conduct of its corporations. 
 226 Id. § 145(1). 
 227 Id. § 145(2).  However, “[i]t is not sufficient merely to tally the § 145 contacts and choose the state 
with the greatest number.  The resolution of choice of law questions turns on the qualitative nature of those 
contacts as affected by the policy factors enumerated in § 6.”  Herrera v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., No. B-07-114, 
2009 WL 700645, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2009) (citations omitted). 
 228 The same argument may be made even where defendant’s conduct may be characterized as having 
occurred outside the state of injury. 
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is most significant.229  In this situation, application of foreign law is justified, if 
not proper. 
However proper, U.S. courts will not consistently and uniformly apply 
foreign law to these disputes absent legislation mandating the same.  Various 
courts employ diverse approaches to choice of law, resulting in notoriously 
unpredictable and inconsistent outcomes.230  In addition, they are particularly 
“unlikely to both apply foreign law and deny a forum non conveniens 
motion,”231 reinforcing the need for a statutory directive to ensure that—when 
faced with a case that would be dismissed to Latin America but for a blocking 
statute—U.S. courts apply foreign law. 
2. Desirability of Application of Foreign Law 
Application of forum law to transnational tort disputes may be appropriate 
when courts can use FNC to dismiss those cases with unacceptably tenuous 
relationships to the forum; absent this ability, however, its application merely 
invites litigation that courts are then powerless to dismiss.  Further, courts 
grant FNC motions only when the alternative forum, at least according to the 
dismissing court, has the most significant relationship to the plaintiff’s claim.  
Thus, in the limited instances where Latin American preemptive legislation 
undermines a court’s ability to dismiss for FNC, application of foreign law—
the law of the forum having the most significant relationship to the claim, and 
the law that would have been applied had the plaintiff refiled in his home 
country following an FNC dismissal—is a reasonable, strategic choice. 
Foremost, application of foreign law is an ideal strategy because it 
simultaneously values the interest of the court and the interest of the plaintiff, 
thus avoiding the major pitfalls presented by the other potential courses of 
action.  While this legislation will discourage foreign plaintiffs from filing in 
the United States,232 it will not deny them this right.233  Further, as this 
legislation mandates consistency, foreign plaintiffs have a well-defined choice 
 
 229 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971); see, e.g., Tazoe v. Aereas, No. 07-
21941-CIV, 2009 WL 3232908 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 24, 2009). 
 230 Symeon C. Symeonides, Oregon’s New Choice-of-Law Codification for Tort Conflicts: An Exegesis, 
88 OR. L. REV. 963, 969 (2009).  (“The excessive fluidity of the various judicial choice-of-law approaches 
often makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to predict the outcome of a choice-of-law decision.”). 
 231 See Heiser, supra note 61, at 1165. 
 232 In contrast to forcing courts to unconditionally accept these cases.  See supra note 194. 
 233 In contrast to manipulating the FNC doctrine to permit dismissals regardless of an alternative forum.  
See supra Part III.A. 
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that should yield a predictable outcome: file first in Latin America and enjoy 
the convenience of litigating at home, or file first in the United States with the 
guaranteed application of Latin American tort law, including its damage 
calculations.  In many situations, the inconvenience of participating in ongoing 
litigation abroad will outweigh the benefits of litigation in the United States 
once the enticement of U.S. law is removed.234 
Equally important, the ability of this approach to preserve a forum for the 
plaintiffs but to make this forum less desirable acts to limit the impact of 
blocking statutes in a nonconfrontational manner.  Currently the courts that 
view these statutes as willful attempts by Latin American legislatures to force 
jurisdiction on the United States manipulate FNC to dismiss regardless.  
Whether this perception is correct, these decisions appear to disrespect the 
plaintiffs’ home countries and their preemptive systems of jurisdiction.  
Choice-of-law legislation thus prevents, to the extent possible, the actions of 
U.S. courts from having undesirable effects in Latin America, which spurred 
the blocking statutes initially,235 while still allowing these courts to protect 
their own interests. 
Admittedly, mandatory application of foreign law denies U.S. courts the 
usual discretion afforded in choice-of-law decisions.236  Further, although 
courts will avoid complicated choice-of-law analysis, this legislation forces 
courts to apply perhaps unfamiliar law, which they are notably hesitant to 
do.237  However, the legislation’s narrow scope and concurrent benefits make 
its application worthwhile despite these downsides. 
CONCLUSION 
Many courts have accepted jurisdiction over cases appropriate for forum 
non conveniens dismissal due to Latin American blocking statutes that render 
the alternative forums unavailable.  This result is doctrinally correct, but 
 
 234 Still, there are numerous procedural and systemic reasons why foreign plaintiffs may still choose to 
file in the United States.  See Heiser, supra note 61, at 1182 (suggesting that foreign plaintiffs would still 
desire to litigate in the United States if courts applied foreign law to their disputes); supra Part I.C.  Intuitively, 
if these plaintiffs are filing for a reason other than U.S. law—e.g., serious procedural deficiencies in their 
home courts that make vindication unlikely—U.S. courts arguably should be less hesitant to accept these 
cases.  However, this position is seriously weakened by the courts’ evaluation of “adequacy,” which largely 
disregards considerations such as chronic delay and backlog, or problems with enforcement.  See supra Part 
I.B. 
 235 See supra notes 138–39 and accompanying text. 
 236 See supra note 224. 
 237 See supra text accompanying notes 220, 231. 
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incentivizes foreign plaintiffs to continue filing these claims in the United 
States and empowers them to unilaterally strip their home courts of 
jurisdiction, further obliging U.S. courts to entertain these disputes.  
Meanwhile, persistent dismissals by other U.S. courts reflect incorrect 
availability analyses, likely prompted by forum shopping concerns and 
exacerbated by the perception of blocking statutes as strategic attempts to 
sterilize the FNC doctrine.  These concerns are valid, but this outcome 
improperly assigns them greater weight than the foreign plaintiffs’ right to a 
forum.  Consequently, the plaintiffs’ legitimate harms go without redress. 
While correct application of FNC is important, any doctrinal manipulation 
aiming solely to reconcile the doctrine with its application by U.S. courts is 
unfaithful to the spirit of FNC unless it also ensures the plaintiffs a forum in 
which to litigate.  Yet some courts will likely misapply any construct of FNC 
so long as they perceive its application to yield an unfair result.  An ideal 
solution will ignore neither the court’s nor the plaintiff’s concerns, instead 
targeting the underlying source of the problem by removing the foremost 
incentive for plaintiffs to file in the United States.  Choice-of-law legislation 
best reconciles a court’s legitimate concerns with a plaintiff’s interests in 
having a court in which to present his case.  By proceeding in this manner, 
U.S. courts can diplomatically protect their own interests, neither denying 
foreign plaintiffs a forum nor dismissing for FNC to Latin American countries 
that perceive the consequences of such dismissals to violate their civil law 
principles of jurisdiction. 
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